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CONTRARY JURISPRUDENCE: TRIBAL
INTERESTS IN NAVIGABLE WATERWAYS
BEFORE AND AFTER MONTANA V.
UNITED STATES
Russel Lawrence Barsh*
James Youngblood Henderson**
In 1974 the Crow Tribal Council enacted a resolution restricting reser-
vation hunting and fishing to tribal members. No distinction was made
between lands owned by the tribe or its members and the nearly thirty
percent of the reservation area held in fee simple by non-members and the
State of Montana. The resolution also purported to govern the Big Horn
River, the bed of which the tribe claimed under its 1868 treaty with the
United States. ' The State of Montana refused to recognize the tribe's ju-
risdiction to enact and enforce this restriction and continued to license
non-member hunting and fishing within the reservation. As record owner
of Indian land on the Crow reservation "in trust" for the tribe, the United
States filed suit in 1975 to quiet title to the riverbed and to establish exclu-
sively federal and tribal authority to regulate hunting and fishing on the
reservation.
Crow claims to the bed of the Big Horn River were first considered in
1976 in United States v. Finch.2 The Ninth Cicuit upheld federal title to
the riverbed "in trust" for the Crows, but its judgment was vacated by
the Supreme Court on unrelated grounds the following year. 3 When the
same issues of title were renewed in United States v. Montana,4 the Ninth
Circuit reaffirmed its holding in Finch. Both Ninth Circuit decisions
noted similarities to the Supreme Court's 1970 opinion in Choctaw Na-
tion v. Oklahoma.5 Like the Choctaws, the Crows relied on a treaty that
described their territory in metes and bounds enclosing the contested wa-
* Associate Professor of Business, Government, and Society, University of Washington Gradu-
ate School of Business Administration; Member, Washington State Bar Ass'n; J.D., 1974, Harvard
University. The insights and advice of Mario Gonzalez, Oglala Sioux Legal Department, are grate-
fully acknowledged.
** Flores, Cervantes & Luna, San Jose, California; J.D., 1974, Harvard University; tribal citi-
zen of the Chikasha Nation and Cheyenne Tribe; guidance provided by Uba Miko and Ma'heo'o,
errors of interpretation are mine.
1. Second Treaty of Fort Laramie, May 7, 1868, 15 Stat. 649.
2. 548 F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated on other grounds, 433 U.S. 676 (1977).
3. Finch v. United States, 433 U.S. 676 (1977). The basis for the decision was double jeopardy.
4. 604 F.2d 1162(9th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 101 S. Ct. 1245 (1981).
5. 397 U.S. 620(1970).
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terway. 6 The United States promised the Choctaws "virtually complete
sovereignty" 7 over their territory; the Crows were to enjoy "absolute and
undisturbed use and occupation" 8 of theirs. If anything, the Crows' case
was stronger. The Choctaws emigrated from the southeast to resettle on
lands patented to them in fee by the United States, while the Crows' terri-
tory was original and never had been subject to the power of the United
States to dispose of lands by patent. The Choctaws' treaty subjected their
government to federal preemption, while the Crows relinquished legisla-
tive jurisdiction only over the allotment of lands in severalty to consent-
ing tribal members.
While the Crow litigation was awaiting review by the Supreme Court,
the Court held in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe9 that Indian tribal
governments lack inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. Imply-
ing congressional intent from legislative silence and assuming its own
conclusions, Oliphant embodied a carelessness with history and pre-
cedent we criticized in an earlier article as indicative of a dangerous intel-
lectual trend. 10 This fear appears justified in light of the Court's opinion
in Montana v. United States.II In holding that title to the bed of the Big
Horn passed to the state upon its admission to the Union, Justice Stewart
for the majority forecloses the conclusion by framing the question,' 2
dismisses the leading case in point as "peculiar" in a footnote, 13 and ad-
vances as controlling a decision which, upon closer examination, stands
for the opposite proposition. 14 This is law by fiat, not reason; but a full
appreciation of the Court's new jurisprudence must begin with a review
of the established principles and authorities it chose to confuse or neglect.
6. See Second Treaty of Fort Laramie. May 7. 1868, art. 2, 15 Stat. 649. 650 (Crow treaty):
Treaty of Sept. 30. 1830, art. 2, 7 Stat. 333 (Choctaw treaty). The Crow treaty is described in Mon-
tana v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 1245, 1249 (198'). The Choctaws entered into numerous treaties
with the United States during the 19th century, as described in Choctaw Nation v, Oklahoma. 397
U.S. 620, 628-32 (1970).
7. This is the Court's description given in Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma. 397 U.S. 620. 635
(1970).
8. Second Treaty of Fort Laramie, May 7. 1868. art. 2. 15 Star. 649, 650.
9. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
10. See Barsh & Henderson, The Betrayval: Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe and the Hunting
ofthe Snark. 63 MINN. L. REv. 609 (1979).
11. 101S. Ct. 1245(1981).
12. See part V.A. infra.
13. See part IV.C. infra.
14. See part IV.B. infra.
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Tribal Interests in Waterways
I. TRIBAL LAND TENURE THROUGH THE
LOOKING-GLASS
The road to Montana v. United States is fraught with doctrinal confu-
sion, bred of superficial analysis. Over the years courts have confused the
various meanings of "reservation" in conveyancing, public land law,
and Indian treaty law, 15 confused federal title in public lands with the
United States' "naked fee" title in tribal lands, 16 and confused the United
States' role as public "trustee" for the states in management of public
lands and waters with its role as "trustee" for Indian tribes and their citi-
zens. 17 In general, the law has flirted periodically with consolidating tri-
bal lands in the general mass of the public domain, wavering between
respect for historical tribal entitlements and impatience for the assimila-
tion of Indians' resources into the nation's economy. An examination of
the role of Montana v. United States and its antecedents in this process
must begin with an identification of the principles and catchwords that
populate the history of tribal land tenure law.
A. "Reservation"
When it "reserves" land by treaty, is the tribe the grantee or the gran-
tor? In the common law:
A technical distinction exists between a "reservation" and an "excep-
tion." A reservation reserves to the grantor some new thing issuing out of
the thing granted and not in esse before, and an exception excludes from
the operation of the grant some existing portion of the estate granted which
would otherwise pass under the general description of the deed. 18
There is some authority that the use of the term "reservation" in convey-
ancing implied not only a right that did not exist before, but one of use
only, such as an easement regranted by the grantee, and in some instances
only a life estate. 19 A strictly formal reading of Indian treaties, therefore,
might lead to the conclusion that, in "reserving" certain lands, tribes
15. See part I.A. infra.
16. See part I.B. infra.
17. See part I.E. infra.
18. Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653, 656 (Utah 1979). Accord, Elkins v. Townsend, 182 F.
Supp. 861, 872 (W.D. La. 1960); Board of County Comm'rs v. Anderson, 34 Colo. App. 74, 525
P.2d 478, 482 (1974), affd sub nom. Anderson v. Union Pac. R.R., 188 Colo. 337, 534 P.2d 1201
(1975); Pfeffer v. Lebanon Land Dev. Corp., 46 111. App. 3d 186, 360 N.E.2d 1115, 1118 (1977);
Gogel v. Blazofsky, 187 Pa. Super. Ct. 32, 142 A.2d 313, 316 (1958); Burnell v. Roush, 404 P.2d
836, 839 (,vyo. 1965).
19. Elwell v. Miner, 342 Mass. 450, 174 N.E.2d 43, 46 (1961); Elrod v. Heirs, 156 Neb. 269,
55 N.W.2d 673, 675 (1952).
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received regrants from the United States of the usufruct, during "life"
(the existence of the tribe), of a portion of the lands ceded to, and there-
fore now part of, the fee estate of the United States. 20
Even if it were proper to base delineation of tribal rights on a nice ter-
minological distinction Indians scarcely would have understood a century
ago, the common law denotation of "reservation" is by no means settled.
"Only a cursory examination of cases is necessary to indicate the terms
reservation and exception often are used interchangeably and that their
distinction is technical, 'slight and shadowy'." 2 As stated by one court:
In the United States, . . . the historical significance of this language has
been lost sight of and it is used almost interchangeably. Moreover, the
Courts, without regard to the particular terms used in the conveyance, con-
strue the language as an exception or reservation according to the character
of the right intended to be created. 22
From an early date, American courts recognized that lands "reserved"
by Indian treaties were unceded rather than regranted. The 1824 case of
Eu-che-lah v. Welsh 23 involved conflicting claims to a tract of land re-
served for an individual Cherokee by treaty. If the reservation was in the
nature of federal regrant after title had passed from the tribe to the United
States, the plaintiff argued, then title to the land had vested in the state
before it could repass to the Indians. North Carolina's Supreme Court
disagreed, ruling that the tribal interest had never lapsed.2 4 Subsequent
federal decisions agreed. A reservation of land "was so much carved out
of the territory ceded, and remained to the Indian occupant, as he has
never parted with it,"25 the Supreme Court concluded in 1850. "He
holds, strictly speaking, not under the treaty of cession, but under his
original title, confirmed by the government in the act of agreeing to the
reservation. "26 "The treaty was not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a
grant of rights from them,-a reservation of those not granted. " 27
20. See. e.g.. United States v. Cook, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 591, 592 (1874).
21. Viceroy Oil Co. v. Hancock Oil Co., 125 Cal. App. 2d 222. 270 P.2d 604. 611 (1954)
(quoting Van Slyke v. Arrowhead Reservoir & Power Co.. 155 Cal. 675. 679. 102 P.2d 816. 818
(1909)).
22. Sackett v. O'Brien, 43 Misc. 2d 476, 251 N.Y.S.2d 863. 866 (Sup. Ct. 1964). Accord.
Phoenix Title & Trust Co. v. Smith, 101 Ariz. 101. 403 P.2d 828, 831 (1965): Luce v. Hassett, I
A.D.2d 917. 149 N.Y.S.2d 533, 534 (1956); Hartman v. Potter. 596 P.2d 653. 656 (Utah 1979):
Sheldon Slate Prods. Co. v. Kurjiaka, 124 Vt. 261, 204 A.2d 99, 103 (1964).
23. 10 N.C. (3 Hawks) 155 (1824).
24. Id. at 165. The North Carolina court reaffirmed this ruling in Sutton v. Moore. 25 N.C. (3
Ired.) 66, 72 (1842).
25. Gaines v. Nicholson, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 356, 365 (1850).
26. Id.
27. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1904). This construction of treaty terms "'re-
serving" land was necessary in the early days of the Republic while the constitutionality of federal
630
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The confusion began with the federal government's practice of with-
holding land for new states and disposing of it over a period of decades.
The unopened federal lands within states were "reserved" from immedi-
ate sale or private appropriation, 28 but not in the same way that Indian
lands were "reserved". 29 In the former case, Congress had power to hold
the unopened lands only for the purpose of disposal to the state and its
citizens, as provided by the state's enabling act. 30 In other words, these
"reservations" were public domain lands temporarily held "in trust" by
the United States for the state under an express compact with state citi-
zens. The federal interest was purely administrative. Any disposal of
these lands for other than a legitimate public benefit to state citizens was a
breach of trust and, in the opinion of the nineteenth-century Supreme
Court, void. 31
As late as 1913 federal courts still recognized the distinction between
federal lands "reserved from sale" for a period of years after statehood
and "country to which the Indians retained the. right of use and occu-
pancy, involving-under certain restrictions-freedom of action and of
enjoyment in their capacity as a distinct people.' '32 But the routine ad-
ministration of both classes of lands was consolidated in the Department
of the Interior in 184933 and, during Reconstruction, Congress began to
combine all federally managed territory for legislative purposes. 34 Begin-
ning in 1862 the railroad donation acts granted free rights-of-way through
both federal and tribal lands, describing both as "public", although pro-
proprietorship within a state remained unsettled. If the "cession" clause of an Indian treaty passed
title to the state, the United States' regrant of a "reservation" might violate both the exclusive legis-
lation and just compensation clauses of the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16; U.S.
CONST. amend. V. To prevent this, early state and federal decisions went so far as to hold that treaties
"reserving" lands for individuals passed title without the need for a formal patent from the United
States. See, e.g., Francis v. Francis, 203 U.S. 233,241-42 (1906); Niles v. Anderson, 4 Miss. 145,
152-53, 5 How. 365, 383 (1841); Newman v. Doe ex dem. Harris & Plummer, 3 Miss. 520, 558, 4
How. 522, 560 (1840); Godfrey v. Iowa Land & Trust Co., 21 Okla. 293, 95 P. 792, 797 (1908).
Some of these early cases are reviewed thoroughly in Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899). Any lapse
in time between cession and the vesting of an individual's rights might have defeated the purpose of
the reservation by interposing state title.
28. Perhaps the earliest judicial discussion of this terminology appears in McConnell v. Wilcox,
2 111. (1 Scam.) 344, 359 (1837).
29. One of the earliest federal decisions to distinguish reservations of public lands from reserva-
tions for Indians is United States v. Myers, 206 F. 387, 394 (8th Cir. 1913).
30. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 222-23 (1845).
31. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1,27 (1894); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 230
(1845).
32. United States v. Myers, 206 F. 387, 394 (8th Cir. 1913).
33. Act of March 3, 1849, ch. 108, §§ 3-4, 9 Stat. 395.
34. See, e.g., Act of March 1, 1873, ch. 217, 17 Stat. 484.
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vision routinely was made for compensation of tribes and their citizens. 35
Depression-era national recovery legislation such as the 1935 Federal
Power Act frequently defined Indian reservations expressly as "public
lands" for subsidy and management purposes. 36
The tribal/public distinction is further confused by historical changes in
treaty policy and terminology. It would be grossly misleading to suppose
that all, or even a significant proportion, of tribal lands are held under the
same language or conditions. 37 Therefore, generalizations about the na-
ture of the rights created or retained by Indian treaties are dangerous. It
35. See, e.g., Nadeau v. Union Pac. R.R., 253 U.S. 442. 444 (1920); Kindred v. Union Pac.
R.R., 225 U.S. 582, 596 (1912); Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kan. Ry.. 135 U.S. 641.658 (1890):
Buttz v. Northern Pac. R.R.. 119 U.S. 55, 59 (1886).
36. The 1935 amendments to the Federal Power Act in effect created two classes of Indian lands.
Those Indian lands owned by the United States were classified together with such federal lands as
national forests and military reservations, but separate from the general public lands. Federal Power
Act, ch. 687. § 201(I)-(2), 49 Stat. 838 (1935) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 796(1)-(2) (1976)). Lands
to which Indians hold title are classified with all other privately owned lands. Cf. Federal Power
Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation. 362 U.S. 99 (1960) (Indian land is subject to eminent domain).
37. A brief review of the United States' more than 300 treaty land transactions with tribes will
illustrate the problem. See 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES (C. Kappler ed. 1904) (compilation
of all Indian treaties). Seventeen treaties simply stipulate the boundary line between U.S. and tribal
territories. Thirteen use terms of confirmation or recognition; for example, the United States 'se-
cures." .'guarantees," or promises to 1'protect" tribal land, to "consider [the tribe] the rightful
owner," or to "acknowledge it to be their property." The term "reserve" appears in 48 treaties, but
special care must be taken to notice and distinguish its variations. Twenty-seven of these instru-
ments-all but one of them executed before 1850-"reserve" small tracts for individual Indians out
of the ceded area. In a score of treaties the United States similarly promised to "grant" parcels of the
ceded area to individual non-Indians chosen by the tribe.
Land within or adjacent to ceded territory was "reserved," "saved and reserved." "reserved and
excepted," or "reserved and set apart" for tribal use 19 times, and simply "set apart" seven times.
Other treaties elaborated on the nature of the rights described. Among the variations, with the fre-
quency of each indicated parenthetically, are: "reserved for set apart] for the use and occupation" of
the tribe (twice); "reserved for the present use and occupation" of the tribe (seven times); "reserved
for the sole use and occupation" of the tribe (once); "set apart for the exclusive [or perpetuall use"
of the tribe (twice): "set apart as the permanent home" of the tribe (once): "set apart and designated
as a permanent reservation" (once); and "set apart for the absolute and undisturbed use and occupa-
tion" of the tribe (eight times). In a few instances the United States merely promised to set apart
some as-yet unidentified lands in the future (five times); or to set apart or reserve lands in the Presi-
dent's discretion (thrice) or subject to divestment at the President's discretion.
Still more troublesome are treaties suggesting an outright conveyance from the United States.
rather than federal confirmation of existing rights. The terms of conveyance employed by treaties
ranged from "allot" (five times), "sell," "possess," and "provide" (once each), to "grant title" or
"in fee" (eight times) and "quit claim" (twice). One tribe's "permanent home" was "assigned."
Many provisions describe the conveyance, circularly, as granting lands "as other Indian lands are
held," while in nine treaties the United States actually "cedes" territory to tribes as it would to any
foreign state. There are two treaties suggesting that the tribe's new home is little more than a tempo-
rary settlement on the public domain: the President merely agrees to "set apart and withhold from
sale" or to "withdraw from sale" the requisite lands. To make matters even more unsettling for
analysis of the issues in Montana v. United States, Congress expressly reserved for itself a paramount
interest in the navigable waters of a tribal "reservation" in only one treaty, the Osage Treaty of 1825.
See Treaty ofJune 2. 1825. art. 2, 7 Stat. 240, 241.
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may be permissible, however, to distinguish three broad categories of tri-
bal/federal land transactions. Most familiar are treaties ceding and retain-
ing portions of a tribe's original national territory. If identified specifi-
cally at all, the retained portion typically was "reserved," "set apart,"
or "secured,''38 which may be taken as words of recognition and confir-
mation of pre-existing territorial rights.
In the second kind of transaction many of the eastern tribes that re-
tained original lands in the early years of the Republic subsequently
agreed to emigrate west of the Mississippi into what was to become
known as Indian Territory. Indian Territory lands were ceded by the orig-
inal inhabitants to the United States, then "given," "granted," or
"ceded" 39 back to the emigrant tribes, suggesting at least in some cases
that tribal title was not merely acknowledged, but created and held under
federal law. n0 Presumably, the United States could regrant ceded land to a
tribe in any form of tenure.
The third category of tribal lands are those "set apart" or "with-
drawn" for tribal use by executive order not in the execution of a specific
treaty engagement or act of Congress. Out of the 162 Indian "reserva-
tions" managed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs in 1890, fifty-six were
created and fifteen enlarged by bare executive orders, 41 nearly all occur-
ring after the Act of March 3, 187142 brought an end to federal treaty-
making with tribes. Because these tribal holdings are truly only tempo-
rary dispositions of public lands, and because they typically were created
after statehood, they may properly be subjected to different rules. The
danger lies in failing to distinguish strictly between tribal use of public
lands withdrawn from entry after statehood, and tribal retention of
unceded aboriginal domain in which neither the state nor the United
States ever held an unencumbered fee. This failure to distinguish lands
properly subject to public domain rules from lands originally and continu-
ally occupied by Indians and therefore properly involving Indian land ten-
ure law persists in modem cases and is perhaps the major problem with
the Court's reasoning in Montana v. United States.
B. The "Naked Fee"
To those unfamiliar with Indian law, a "naked fee" may sound more
38. See note 37 supra.
39. Seeid.
40. See generally Barsh & Henderson, supra note 10, at 617-18; Henderson, Unraveling the
Riddle ofAboriginal Title, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 75, 108 (1977).
41. Royce, Indian Land Cessions in the United States, in EIGHTEENTH ANN. REP. OF BUREAU OF
AM. ETHNOLOGY, pt. 2, 527, 641 (1899).
42. Ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 566 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 27 (1976)).
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like the entrance charge to a nudist camp than the foundation upon which
most of the land titles in this country rest. Although the British Crown
always accorded the territorial claims of Indian tribes the greatest respect,
it was customary from the first European settlement on this continent to
subdivide the task of colonial settlement and administration through vast
land grants. 43 Crown grants in North America delegated responsibility for
the preservation of order, regulation of trade and commerce, and acquisi-
tion of actual possession of the soil from the natives. The grants were
jurisdictional rather than proprietary in nature. Grantees supported them-
selves by reselling and taxing or leasing lands purchased from the aborigi-
nal inhabitants.
When the colonies rebelled, they used a similar scheme for financing
the war. Lands still occupied by Indians could be granted to financiers as
collateral, or to officers and common soldiers in lieu of wages. The right
of actual possession of granted lands was conditioned upon the successful
conclusion of the revolution and subsequent purchase of the Indian inter-
est by the fledgling government or by the grantees themselves. "It was
one of the great resources that sustained the war," the Supreme Court
observed two generations later. 44 Unfortunately, the scheme also proved
to be a great source of confusion and labor for the courts, as peace and
westward emigration generated conflicts between grantees from state and
national authorities, from different states with overlapping western
claims, or from American officials and tribal officials. Grantees began to
seek federal help or, through ejectment actions, the help of the courts in
clearing away the encumbrance of Indian possession. 45 Since the conti-
nent remained chiefly in tribal hands and all the Republic's new govern-
ments were in debt, all of these governments had an interest in maximiz-
ing their share of the authority to grant lands still occupied by Indians.
The Supreme Court first faced this problem in 1810. The real issue in
Fletcher v. Peck4 6 was whether Georgia's state legislature, having
granted a strip of land to private speculators, could subsequently revoke
the grant on grounds of fraud or mistake and regrant the land to others. In
a lengthy opinion the Court held that legislative land grants, once vested,
are protected from confiscation by the contracts clause. The Court ducked
the regrantees' alternative argument that the original grant had been void
when made, because the land was then occupied by Indians. In the con-
43. See. e.g., Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (extended discussion of
Crown lands policy): INDIANS OF THE SOUTHERN COLONIAL FRONTIER: THE EDMOND ATKIN REPORT
AND PLAN OF 1755 (W. Jacobs ed. 1954).
44. Clark v. Smith, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 195. 201 (1839).
45. See, e.g., Johnson v. M'Intosh. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823): Fletcher v. Peck. 10 U.S. (6
Cranch) 87 (1810).
46. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87(1810).
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cluding paragraph of the opinion, without citation of authority, Chief Jus-
tice Marshall summarily ruled that the original grantees' interest had been
lawful, but not such as to sustain ejectment against the tribe. "The major-
ity of the court is of opinion that the nature of the Indian title, which is
certainly to be respected by all courts, until it be legitimately extin-
guished, is not such as to be absolutely repugnant to seizin in fee on the
part of the state," or the state's grantees. 47
In dissent, Justice Johnson objected to the majority's characterization
of the state's interest as a "fee," although he did not deny its alienability
while the Indians remained in possession. The majority, he asserted,
clouded the issue by identifying but not defining the tribe's overriding
estate. "That is," Justice Johnson wrote, the Court held "that the state of
Georgia was seized of an estate in fee-simple in the lands in question,
subject to another estate, we know not what, nor whether it may not swal-
low up the whole estate decided to exist in Georgia. "48 Tribes retain their
national political character, he argued, except to the extent that the United
States preempts the cession of their lands to other nations. Hence " [a]ll of
the restrictions upon the right of soil in the Indians, amount only to an
exclusion of all competitors from their markets . . . . ,149 "Can, then, one
nation be said to be seized of a fee-simple in lands, the right to soil of
which is in another nation?,''50 he asked. Until the tribal estate was pur-
chased for Georgia by the United States, Justice Johnson concluded,
"[t]o me it appears that the interest of Georgia in that land amounted to
nothing more than a mere possibility, and that her conveyance thereof
could operate legally only as a covenant to convey or to stand seized to a
use." 51 Georgia had an estate, but not in fee simple.
The Court took up Justice Johnson's argument thirteen years later in
Johnson v. M'Intosh,52 a conflict between the United States' patentee to
Illinois land and a prior grantee from the tribe itself. The nature of the
tribe's estate was raised unavoidably: was the tribe's interest such that it
could convey a fee title good against a subsequent grant from the United
States? In order to preserve the nation's profitable practice of granting
"possibilities" in lands still occupied by tribes, the Court had to finesse
the meaning of "fee simple," leaving the United States the power to
grant, and the Indians the right to remain. The Chief Justice's solution
was to distinguish between two meanings of "title," giving the United
47. Id. at 142-43.
48. Id. at 146.
49. Id. at 147.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 146.
52. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
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States "title" in the international sense and the tribes the operational
equivalent of title in the common law sense.
When European nations found themselves in conflict over their New
World claims, Chief Justice Marshall wrote, they fixed upon a
law by which the right of acquisition [from the natives], which they all as-
serted, should be regulated as between themselves. This principle was that
discovery gave title to the government by whose subjects, or by whose au-
thority, it was made, against all other European governments, which title
might be consummated by possession. 53
The natives themselves "were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the
soil, with a legal as well as just clain to retain possession of it, and to use
it according to their own discretion," except only in the matter of sale to
Europeans. 54 Finally, European nations "claimed and exercised, as a
consequence of this ultimate [i.e., international] dominion, a power to
grant the soil, while yet in possession of the natives. These grants have
been understood by all to convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the
Indian right of occupancy." 55
A European grant, therefore, gave the grantee title good against all the
world except the Indians. As a practical matter this left the Indians in full
possession, immune from ejectment, albeit their estate was characterized
as only"possession" or "occupancy" as if it were merely a servitude or
encumbrance. Early federal legislation, for example, exempted unceded
tribal lands from survey even if they had been granted. 56 If the tribe did
sell to an individual non-Indian, rather than to the United States, the pur-
chaser took simply what interest the tribe itself had-undisturbed use and
possession until the tribe's territory as a whole was ceded to the Union.
Unless expressly saved by the terms of the treaty of cession, the pur-
chaser's right then passed to the United States' patentees.5 7
Subsequent decisions confirmed the power of the states and the United
53. Id. at 573 (emphasis added).
54. Id. at 574 (emphasis added).
55. Id. (emphasis added). This line of reasoning is nicely restated in Holden v. Joy. 84 U.S ( 17
Wall.) 211, 242-44 (1872). "'Discovery" as a source of title among nations has been rejected b, the
International Court of Justice, where the "discovered" land is already inhabited by tribes having a
social and political organization. See Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, [1 975] I.C.J. 3. 39-40:
cf. Judgment on North Sea Continental Shelf Cases. [1969] I.C.J. 3 (disputes regarding title over
continental shelf land are to be settled by agreement: discovery or occupation gives no rights). See
also Island of Palmas (United States v. Netherlands), Hague Ct. Rep. 2d (Scott) 98 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
1928), reprinted in 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 867, 883-84 (discovery must be accompanied by occupation
to create title).
56. E.g., Act of May 18. 1796. ch. 29. I Stat. 464: Act of May 20. 1785. 28 Journals of the
Continental Congress 375: see St. Paul & Pac. R.R. v. Schurmeier. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 272. 285
(1869).
57. Johnson, 21 U.S (8 Wheat.) at 593-94.
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States to make fee grants of unceded tribal lands, 58 and it became com-
mon in the latter part of the nineteenth century to refer to the tribe's origi-
nal and unceded estate as a "right of occupancy," and the result of a fee-
simple grant of the same land as a "naked" or unconsummated fee. 59
Although the courts agreed, as a "settled principle, that [the tribes'] right
of occupancy is considered as sacred as the fee-simple of the whites"
under the law, 60 this terminology invited confusion-and confusion
obliged. As early as 1842, in Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 61 the Supreme
Court hinted that the Indian's right, because it was not "title," was not
permanent and might be cut off involuntarily. Chief Justice Taney wrote
for the Court in Martin:
For according to the principles of international law, as then understood by
the civilized powers of Europe, the Indian tribes in the new world were
regarded as mere temporary occupants of the soil, and the absolute rights of
property and dominion were held to belong to the European nation by which
any particular portion of this country was first discovered. Whatever
forbearance may have been sometimes practiced towards the unfortunate
aborigines, either from humanity or policy, yet the territory they occupied
was disposed of by the governments of Europe at their pleasure, as if it had
been found without inhabitants. 62
As the century progressed, courts leaned towards the spirit of this Taney
dictum, and John Marshall's cunning device of separating title from pos-
session fell apart.
C. "Plenary Power"
For a hundred years no one supposed that tribes' "right of occupancy"
could be terminated or "extinguished" involuntarily. Indeed, for a hun-
dred years no one supposed that the United States had power, absent a
specific delegation of auth-rity by treaty, to interfere in tribes' internal
police of commerce. 63 A change in policy and law evolved, not surpris-
ingly, during Reconstruction, a period when even the reserved constitu-
58. E.g., Lattimer's Lessee v. Poteet, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 4, 14 (1840) (but title of grantee ulti-
mately held invalid under North Carolina statute); Clark v. Smith, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 195 (1839).
59. E.g., United States v. Thomas, 151 U.S. 577, 583 (1894); Buttz v. Northern Pac. R.R., 119
U.S. 55, 66 (1886); Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517,525 (1877).
60. Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 746 (1835). Accord, Shoshone Tribe of
Indians v. United States, 299 U.S. 476, 497 (1937); Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 389
(1902); Clark v. Smith, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 195,201 (1839).
61. 41 U.S. (16Pet.)367(1842).
62. Id. at 409 (emphasis added).
63. See, e.g., Blue Jacket v. Commissioners of Johnson County (The Kansas Indians), 72 U.S.
(5 Wall.) 737, 755-56 (1867); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515,546-47,553-54 (1832).
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tional powers of states were superseded, albeit temporarily, by "benefi-
cial" federal supervisory administration. 64 Within a generation, Congress
subjected tribal areas to a broad range of "protective" laws, federal con-
tainment and policing, and coercive subdivision and sale of unceded
lands. 65 The process by which the Reconstruction-era Supreme Court
gradually accepted and rationalized this federal encroachment on tribal
affairs laid the groundwork for nearly transforming the Marshallian right
of permanent "occupancy" into a mere tenancy-at-will.
The root of this doctrinal tree was Beecher v. Wetherby, 66 decided in
1877. When Wisconsin became a state in 1848, much of its land area was
unceded Chippewa territory. The Chippewas subsequently ceded the tract
at issue to the United States. In 1870 the state granted the "school lands"
sections of the tract, and in 1872 the United States patented the same
sections adversely, resulting in an action to try title. The Supreme Court
held that these sections had vested in Wisconsin automatically as soon as
the tribe ceded them, since the United States previously had covenanted
to convey them by compact-the state enabling act-with the state's citi-
zens. 67 This settled the actual contoversy, but in dictum the Court went
on to characterize the nature of the Chippewa estate prior to their cession.
But the right which the Indians held was only that of occupancy. The fee
was in the United States, subject to that right, and could be transferred by
them whenever they chose. The grantee, it is true, would take only the
naked fee, and could not disturb the occupancy of the Indians; that occu-
pancy could only be interfered with or determined by the United States. 68
Was the Court suggesting that the United States could "interfere" with
tribal possessory rights without tribal consent? As if to dispel any doubt
that this indeed was its intention, the Court observed that in interfering
with or determining tribal rights "[it is to be presumed that in this matter
the United States would be governed by such considerations of justice as
would control a Christian people in their treatment of an ignorant and
dependent race." 69 This phrasing subtly ascribed to Chief Justice Taney's
earlier dictum 70 that the tribal right is one of "humanity or policy" only,
64. See generally M. BAILEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN THE INDIAN TERRITORY (1972).
65. See R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND POLITICAL LIBERTY 62-74
(1980). See generally Barsh & Henderson, Tribal Courts, the Model Code, and the Police Idea in
American Indian Policy, 40 L. & CONT'rMP. PROB. 25, 35-39 (1976).
66. 95 U.S. 517 (1877).
67. "'In the present case, there can hardly be a doubt that Congress intended to vest in the State
the fee to section sixteen in every township, subject, it is true .... to the existing occupancy of the
Indians .... " Id. at 526.
68. Id. at 525 (emphasis added).
69. Id.
70. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
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rather than a constitutionally protected property right. Although dictum
itself, the observation in Beecher was to be relied on as authority for a
succession of decisions eroding tribal land rights.
In Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railway,71 the Cherokees
sought to enjoin the United States' grant of a railroad right-of-way
through their territory. Although the tribe had agreed to the right-of-way
in an 1866 treaty, 72 providing a readily available ground for decision, the
Court embarked on a protracted general discussion of tribes' "depen-
dency" ,73 on the United States and of Congress' general powers under the
Constitution to make "needful rules" for the management of the public
domain. The Court concluded that tribal sovereignty was sufficiently in-
ferior to federal sovereignty, and tribal territory sufficiently part of the
territory of the United States, that Congress could exercise eminent do-
main over it as though it were "like the lands held by private owners
everywhere within the geographical limits of the United States." 74
Shortly after Southern Kansas Railway, Congress "allotted" the
Cherokee Nation's territory in severalty. 75 The United States' appoint-
ment of an all-white board, the Dawes Commission, to determine entitle-
ment to the land was highly unpopular. In Stephen v. Cherokee Nation
76
the Cherokees challenged the authority of Congress to interfere with the
tribe's determination of its own membership. The Supreme Court sum-
marily upheld the power of the Dawes Commission, relying entirely on
Southern Kansas Railway.77 Without discussion, the power to exercise
eminent domain over Indians' fee patent lands, previously alleged merely
in dictum, became the power to alter tribal legislation regulating its citi-
zenship.
This doctrinal tree branched and flowered three years later in Cherokee
Nation v. Hitchcock.78 Questioning Congress' power to regulate mineral
exploration and development on tribal land, the Cherokees argued that the
71. 135 U.S. 641 (1890).
72. TreatyofJuly 19, 1866, art. 11, 14Stat. 799.
73. 135 U.S. at 654-55. As we have shown elsewhere, the "dependency" of tribes first sug-
gested by Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831), was meant in the international
sense as a consensual relation of protection. See R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, supra note 65, at 50-61.
74. 135 U.S. at 657. In its haste the Court neglected to note that a different principle should
apply to unceded aboriginal land. The Cherokees' land in Indian Territory was held under fee patents
from the United States and, except as limited by treaty, Congress might well subject that kind of land
to the same principles that govern non-Indians' fee-patent property. A case involving unceded tribal
territory would have to base congressional power, if any, on some other theory.
75. Act of March 3, 1893, ch. 209, § 16, 27 Stat. 612, 645. Such an allotment was permitted by
the 1866 Cherokee treaty. Treaty of July 19, 1866, art. 11, 14 Stat. 799.
76. 174 U.S. 455 (1899).
77. See id. at 484-86.
78. 187 U.S. 294(1902).
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supervision was a "taking" of property vested by treaty. The Supreme
Court disagreed, stating that Stephen's holding that Congress may regu-
late tribal membership "necessarily involved the further holding that
Congress was vested with authority to adopt measures to make the tribal
property productive, and secure therefrom an income for the benefit of the
tribe.' 79 The power of Congress over tribes and their property indeed
was pervasive or "plenary," the Court suggested,8 0 extending to every
legislative object. Moreover, "the power being political and administra-
tive in its nature, the manner of its exercise is a question within the prov-
ince of the legislative branch to determine, and is not one for the
courts."-81 In effect, the Court waived jurisdiction of any further chal-
lenges of congressional Indian affairs legislation.
D. Indian Lands and the Public Domain
What was the source of this seemingly unlimited proprietary and legis-
lative power? Here also the threads of public domain law and Indian law
began to intertwine. Although as early as 1846 the courts behaved as if
federal power over tribal communities had something to do with the prop-
erty clause, 82 the connection did not ripen into an express doctrine until
nearly a century later. Understanding the origins and meaning of federal
"trusteeship" over tribal lands today takes the inquiry back to 1828,
when the Supreme Court was called on to decide whether Congress could
acquire and rule territory outside of the original states, a question that had
been hotly debated since the Louisiana Purchase in 1803. In American
Insurance Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 83 Chief Justice Marshall reasoned
for the Court that the power of territorial acquisition is implicit in the
constitutional powers of war and treatymaking, since it is one of the most
common objectives of foreign affairs.84 On federal authority to govern
communities within an acquired area, Chief Justice Marshall was equally
certain of the existence of the power but less so of the source.
Perhaps the power of governing a territory belonging to the United
States, which has not, by becoming a state acquired the means of self-
79. Id. at 307.
80. Id. at 306.
81. Id. at 308. Accord, Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903), wherein the Court
states: "Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from
the beginning, and the power has always been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by
the judicial department of the government. -
82. See United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567,572 (1846).
83. 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 511 (1828).
84. Id. at 542. Note how the earlier case of Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543. 595 (1823),
avoided this same problem by means of the fiction that the United States already owned title to the
territory by virtue of discovery.
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government, may result necessarily from the facts, that it is not within the
jurisdiction of any particular state, and is within the power and jurisdiction
of the United States. The right to govern, may be the inevitable conse-
quence of the right to acquire territory. Whichever may be the source
whence the power is derived, the possession of it is unquestioned. 85
What had been done, then, was lawful because it had been done.
The tie-in to Indian law was made in United States v. Rogers, 86 another
Taney decision penned shortly after his pronouncement on Indian title in
Martin v. Waddell's Lessee. Here again, Chief Justice Taney sowed the
seeds of broad doctrine through dictum. Rogers was a criminal prosecu-
tion under federal laws regulating the conduct of non-Indians trading or
residing in tribal territory. The defendant, a non-Indian citizen of the
United States by birth, unsuccessfully claimed at trial to be a naturalized
Cherokee. Because the Cherokees had acknowledged the United States'
jurisdiction over non-Indians within their territory in several treaties, 87
federal power over the defendant plainly existed. Chief Justice Taney
nevertheless based the court's holding on a novel and expansive principle:
[W]e think it too firmly and clearly established to admit of dispute, that the
Indian tribes residing within the territorial limits of the United States are
subject to their authority, and where the country occupied by them is not
within the limits of one of the States, Congress may by law punish any
offense committed there, no matter whether the offender be a white man or
an Indian. 88
Chief Justice Taney was analogizing to the principle set forth in 356
Bales that national territory outside of any state must be governed exclu-
sively by the laws of the United States. Although his formulation implied
that Congress lacked regulatory power over unceded tribal lands within
the boundaries of a state, a decade earlier the Court in Worcester v. Geor-
gia89 had held that states also lacked jurisdiction over tribal lands within
their boundaries. The Rogers dictum therefore would have made tribes
within state boundaries more self-governing than tribes in the unsettled
west!
85. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 542-43. For other discussions by the Supreme Court of the federal power
to acquire and govern territory outside of the original states, see Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 32-46 (1890); Murphey v. Ramsey, 114
U.S. 15, 44 (1885); Cross v. Harrison, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 164, 194 (1853); Benner v. Porter, 50
U.S. (9 How.) 235,242 (1850).
86. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846).
87. E.g., Treaty of Dec. 29, 1835, art. 5, 7 Stat. 478.
88. 45U.S. (4 How.) at 572.
89. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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This apparent paradox was resolved forty years later in United States v.
Kagama.90 Holding that Congress may enact criminal laws for Indians
residing in unceded territory within a state, the Supreme Court explained:
But these Indians are within the geographical limits of the United States.
The soil and the people within these limits are under the political control of
the government of the United States, or of the states of the Union. There
exists within the broad domain of sovereignty but these two. There may be
cities, counties, and other organized bodies with limited legislative func-
tions, but they are all derived from, or exist in, subordination to one or the
other of these. 9'
According to Kagana, then, Congress, by process of elimination, must
be the tribes' supreme legislature-the same process of elimination that
had led the Marshall Court in 356 Bales to repose plenary authority over
the territories in Congress. The Kagamna Court explained the congressio-
nal plenary power as follows:
But this power of Congress to organize territorial governments, and make
laws for their inhabitants, arises, not so much from the clause in the Consti-
tution in regard to disposing of and making rules and regulations concerning
the territory and other property of the United States, as from the ownership
of the countr .... 92
Since the United States owned the "naked fee" in unceded tribal lands, 93
it followed that the United States enjoyed supreme legislative authority
over tribal people, whether or not located within a state. The nation's
"naked fee" in tribal lands was evolving into something considerably
more than a preemptive right of purchase.
This expansion of congressional authority over Indian lands occurred
alongside the evolution of expanded federal powers over the general pub-
lic domain. The Court in 356 Bales had addressed only the power of Con-
gress over territory outside of the states. Pollard v. Hagan,94 decided in
1845, involved public lands retained by the United States within the new
state of Alabama. The validity of a Spanish land grant made prior to the
Louisiana Purchase was dispositive of the actual controversy, 95 but the
Court took the opportunity to expound at length on the nature of the
United States' tenure in public lands generally. When Alabama was ad-
90. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
91. Id. at 379-80.
92. Id. at 380 (emphasis added). See also United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 284 (1909).
93. See generally part I.B. supra.
94. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845),
95. See id. at 225-28.
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mitted to the Union in 1819, the United States had retained control of
"waste and unappropriated lands," some of which it subsequently
granted directly to individuals. 96
Indefinite federal management of the retained lands was unlawful, the
Supreme Court concluded. 97 In retaining the unappropriated lands, the
United States had been only a temporary administrative intermediary be-
tween, on the one hand, the states of Virginia and Georgia, which had
earlier surrendered their claims to the land to the United States, and the
new State of Alabama on the other. Since the instruments surrendering
the land provided that any new states formed from the surrendered area
were to stand on equal footing with the original members of the union,
"[w]hen the United States accepted the cession of the territory, they took
upon themselves the trust to hold the municipal eminent domain for the
new States, and to invest them with it, to the same extent, in all respects,
that it was held by the States ceding the territories." 98 But the court did
not limit itself to these facts. It contended further that in general "the
United States have no constitutional capacity to exercise municipal juris-
diction, sovereignty, or eminent domain, within the limits of a State or
elsewhere, except in cases in which it is expressly granted." 99 New states
may, "temporarily, [be] deprived of control over the public lands," OO
but permanent federal proprietorship is limited by the exclusive legisla-
tion clause 101 to arsenals, dockyards and the like. 102 "We, therefore,
think," the Court concluded, that "the United States hold[s] the public
lands within the new States by force of the deeds of cession, and the stat-
utes connected with them, and not by any municipal sovereignty which it
may be supposed they possess." 1'03 The Court even went so far as to sug-
gest that Alabama's disclaimer of "waste and unappropriated lands" was
unconstitutional and void. 104
Pollard's sweeping condemnation of federal land ownership within the
states arose on peculiar facts. Only a fraction of the nation's trans-Appa-
lachian acquisitions were, like Alabama, carved out of areas ceded to the
United States by one or more of the original states. The breadth and popu-
96. Id. at 224.
97. Id.at 221.
98. Id. at 222-23 (emphasis added). The Court defined "eminent domain" in this context as the
power "of disposing, in case of necessity,. . of all the wealth contained in the State." Id. at 223.
99. Id. at 223 (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 224.
101. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
102. "And these are the only cases, within the United States, in which all the powers of govern-
ment are united in a single government .. "Pollard, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 223.
103. Id. at 224.
104. Id.
Washington Law Review
larity of Pollard's dictum nevertheless resulted in its universal application
to situations not involving state-cession lands. 105 When this extension fi-
nally was challenged in 1894,106 the Supreme Court simply pointed to its
numerous decisions applying Pollard to other states, without distinction
or discussion, and closed the matter asfait accompli. 107
Pollard accomplished more than the establishment of the right of states
to public domain lands within their borders. It also gave birth to the idea
that the United States holds these lands "in trust" for the states and their
citizens, a characterization of federal tenure that was to achieve wide-
spread familiarity. Indeed, Pollard's "trust" terminology became its
only lasting achievement, for later decisions of the Supreme Court were
to recast the United States as "trustee" for all the people of the nation,
rather than just for the people of the state in which the public domain land
is located, and accordingly to extend the powers and duration of the
"trust" in defeat of state claims. 08
Unfortunately, the characterization of the federal government as 'trus-
tee" would also work in time to erode Indian tribes' sovereignty over
unceded aboriginal lands.
E. "Trusteeship" and Title "In Trust"
Groping for a term of legal art to describe the political status of Indian
tribes in treaty relations with the United States, Chief Justice Marshall in
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia'0 9 hit upon "dependent." 110 As understood
in international law, a "dependent" nation was one that had, by treaty,
sought and received the protection of another state without surrendering
its domestic sovereignty or statehood."' Such an arrangement well suited
the Cherokees, whose treaties delegated powers of war, foreign affairs,
and foreign trade to the United States. Subsequent Courts, however, ne-
glected the requirement that this relationship arise by mutual consent, not
merely out of the supposed condition or geography of tribes. 112 Confu-
105 See, e.g.. Knight v. United Land Ass'n. 142 U.S. 161. 183 (1891): Packer v. Bird. 137
U.S. 661. 671 (1891): Weber v. Board of State Harbor Comm'rs. 85 U S. (18 Wall ) 57. 65-66
(1873): Mumford v. Wardwell. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 423. 436 (1867).
106. Shively v. Bowlby. 152 U.S. I (1894).
107. Id.at26-31.
108. E.g., Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 524 (1897); United States v. Trinidad Coal
& Coking Co.. 137 U.S. 160, 170 (1890).
109. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) I (1831).
110. Id. at 17.
1Il. H. WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 33-34 (1866). reprinted in CLASSICS
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 44-45 (1. Scott ed. 1936).
112. This neglect is particularly apparent in United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375. 383-84
(1886): "From their very weakness and helplessness. so largely due to the course of dealing of the
federal government with them. . . . there arises the duty of protection. and with it the power."
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sion was further engendered by Marshall's ill-chosen analogy between
international "dependency" and a common-law guardian and ward rela-
tionship. 113 This analogy became the foundation for turn-of-the-century
rationalizations of "plenary power" as inherent in the United States' role
as Indians' legal guardian. 114 All that was needed to draw together these
threads of public domain law with Indian affairs was to conclude that the
United States holds the "naked fee" in unceded tribal lands "in trust"
for the Indians, as it holds the fee in public domain "in trust" for citi-
zens.
The first step in this direction was taken by Congress. The 1887 Gen-
eral Allotment Act 15 subdivided tribal lands and allotted them among
individual Indians. Title to each tract was held by the United States "in
trust" 11 6 for the allottee, with express authority to supervise and restrict
alienation. 11 7 The courts readily inferred from this statutory arrangement
greater power than Congress had specified. Since title was in the United
States "in trust," the allotments were deemed to be federal instrumentali-
ties immune from state and local taxation. "18 There was implied power to
manage timber and other natural resources on allotted lands.119 And, be-
cause the object of the Act "could not be accomplished if the enforce-
ment [of restraints on alienation] were left to the Indians themselves," 120
the United States had implicit standing to sue on allottees' behalf, with or
without their consent. 12 1 According to the Court, Congress even pos-
sessed power to terminate its "trust" at pleasure, regardless of the wishes
or interest of the allottee. 122
The courts confined the idea of trusteeship and the powers that went
with it to allotted lands only briefly. As early as 1912 the Supreme Court
concluded that "[t]his national interest [in exercising its guardianship] is
not to be expressed in terms of property, or to be limited to the assertion
of rights incident to the ownership of a reversion or to the holding of a
113. 30U.S. (5Pet.)at 17.
114. E.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903); Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock,
187 U.S. 294, 306 (1902). See generally notes 78-81 and accompanying text supra.
115. Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-389 (1976)).
116. Id.§5.
117. Id.
118. See McCurdy v. United States, 264 U.S. 484, 486 (1924); United States v. Rickert, 188
U.S. 432,437-38 (1903).
119. See generally Barsh, U.S. v. Mitchell Decision Narrows Trust Responsibility, AM. INDIAN
J., August 1980, at 2.
120. Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413,438 (1912).
121. Id.
122. In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488, 508-09 (1905). The Supreme Court recently has returned to
construing the United States' trusteeship duties under the 1887 General Allotment Act strictly, appar-
ently in response to pressure from the Justice Department to narrow potential federal liability for
misfeasance. Barsh, supra note 119, at 2.
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technical title in trtust." 123 Like the earlier concept of "plenary
power,"' 2 4 trusteeship flowed from the condition of tribes rather than
from any particular bilateral or unilateral instruments. It was not long be-
fore the Court would say:
[A]s regards tribal property subject to the control of the United States as
guardian of Indians, Congress may make such changes in the management
and disposition as it deems necessary to promote their welfare. The United
States is now exercising, under the claim that the property is tribal, the pow-
ers of a guardian and of a trustee in possession. 125
The shift from "plenary power" to "trusteeship" as the rationalization
of power is of more than academic interest. On its face, at least, it sug-
gested some degree of accountability for exercises of the power, notwith-
standing earlier Court decisions 26 placing congressional dispositions of
tribal property beyond judicial competence. It also opened the door to a
host of conflicts between the United States' dual roles as trustee of lands
both "for the people" and for the tribes.
Nowhere was the conflict between these dual "trusts" more evident
than in the United States' use of its expanded public domain powers to
implement its obligations to the tribes. Federal land transactions with
tribes after 1871 were administered increasingly through public lands or-
ders rather than through treaties or agreements. 127 "Reservations" for
123. Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413. 437 (1912) (emphasis added). Heckman was
cited and followed by the Court in Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation. 362 U.S. 99.
11i (1960). For contemporary purposes it might be said that the United States holds only the "naked
fee" to tribal lands "in trust," this trust arising from federal treaty obligations to secure and defend
tribal possession. Although section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. § 465
(1976), expressly authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to take new lands "in trust" for tribes.
nowhere has Congress specifically declared that the United States holds unceded tribal territory "in
trust" for tribes.
124. See generally part I.C. supra.
125. Morrison v. Work, 266 U.S. 481, 485 (1924).
126. E.g.. Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 308 (1902). See generallv note 81 and
accompanying text supra.
127. As the notion of federal "trusteeship" of the public domain expanded in the late 19th cen-
tury to assume the national, as opposed to the state, "public" as beneficiary, so did the discretionary
scope of federal land management. See, e.g., Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518. 524 11897):
United States v. Trinidad Coal & Coking Co., 137 U.S. 160, 170 (1890). The Justices who sat on the
Court in Pollard v. Hagan. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845). would have been astonished by the Court's
cavalier disposition of United States v. Midwest Oil Co.. 236 U.S. 459 (1915), seventy years later.
Recall that Pollard considered an express act of Congress. ratified by the state, unconstitutional to the
extent that it purported to disclaim the state's interest in "waste and unappropriated" public lands.
See generally notes 97-104 and accompanying text supra. In Midwest Oil the issue was whether the
President had power to withdraw public lands within a state from entry or sale without the color of
specific statutory authority. In resolving the question in the affirmative, the Supreme Court relied on
the effect of long usage, as it had in American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511
(1828) (discussed in notes 83-85 and accompanying text supra). The Court observed that the Presi-
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tribes were enlarged by withdrawing adjacent public lands from entry,
and diminished by opening them to entry. The more common these prac-
tices became, the more tempting it was for courts simply to equate tribal
lands with public lands and to apply the same rules to both. Numerous
federal railroad donations acts expressly including "Indian reservations"
in their definitions of "public lands" encouraged this trend. 128
F. "Recognition" of Tribal Tenure
The twentieth-century concept of "recognized" tribal title forms the
last piece of the puzzle, serving to protect some part of the tribal estate
from the radical implications of nineteenth-century concepts of "plenary
power" and federal "trust" management of the public domain. The first
hint of "recognition" appeared in the Supreme Court's 1835 opinion in
Mitchel v. United States. 129 After reviewing Chief Justice Marshall's dis-
cussion of European title-by-discovery in Johnson v. M'Intosh, 130 Justice
Baldwin turned his attention to the effects of treaties on tribal tenure.
dent "ha[d], during the past eighty years, without express statutory [authority],-but under the claim
of power so to do-made a multitude of Executive orders which operated to withdraw public land
that would otherwise have been open to private acquisition." Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at 469.
"[W]hen it appeared that the public interest would be served by withdrawing or reserving parts of the
public domain, nothing was more natural than to retain what the government already owned." Id. at
471. The Court continued:
It may be argued that while these facts and rulings prove a usage, they do not establish its
validity. But government is a practical affair, intended for practical men. Both officers, law-
makers, and citizens naturally adjust themselves to any long-continued action of the Execu-
tive Department, on the presumption that unauthorized acts would not have been allowed to
be so often repeated as to crystallize into a regular practice. That presumption is not reasoning
in a circle, but the basis of a wise and quieting rule that, in determining the meaning of a
statute or the existence of a power, weight shall be given to the usage itself,-even when the
validity of the practice is the subject of investigation.
Id. at 472-73. The Midwest Oil Court gave no thought to the state's interest in eventual possession,
implicitly reversing the reasoning in Pollard that equal footing requires the prompt termination of the
United States' public lands "trust." From this base, then, Congress and the Executive were freed to
separately and indefinitely administer their "trusts" for the national and state "publics."
128. See, e.g., Nadeau v. Union Pac. R.R., 253 U.S. 442 (1920); Kindred v. Union Pac. R.R.,
225 U.S. 582 (1912). The extreme expression of this line of thinking was United States v. Cook, 86
U.S. (19 Wall.) 591 (1874), a federal action to replevy logs cut from "reservation" land by individ-
ual Indians. The land had been ceded to the United States by the Menominees, then regranted to a
party of emigrant New York Indians to be held by them "as Indian lands are held." "[T]o justify any
cutting of the timber, except for use upon the premises, as timber or its product, it must be done in
good faith for the improvement of the land," the Supreme Court reasoned. Id. at 593. It stated: "Any
cutting beyond this would be waste and unauthorized. . . . What a tenant for life may do upon the
lands of a remainderman the Indians may do upon their reservations, but no more." Id. at 593-94.
Who was the remainderman, the people of the state or of the United States? In either case, the tribe's
estate was as "sacred as the fee-simple of the whites" in words only. Cook seemed to mean that tribal
land was to be treated as a temporary withdrawal of public lands for a limited federal purpose.
129. 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711 (1835).
130. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (discussed in notes 52-57 and accompanying text supra).
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By thus holding treaties with these Indians, accepting of cessions from
them with reservations, and establishing boundaries with them, the king
waived all rights accruing by conquest or cession, and thus most solemnly
acknowledged that the Indians had rights of property which they could cede
or reserve, and that the boundaries of his territorial and proprietary rights
should be such, and such only as vere stipulated by these treaties. 13'
Once the Crown or the United States acknowledged a tribe's statehood by
treaty, then, the tribe no longer held its unceded territory merely by
"right of occupancy," but as property protected by municipal as well as
international law. As property within the European land-tenure paradigm,
the tribe's lands henceforth were "inviolable by the power of Con-
gress." 132
Justice Baldwin's insight lay dormant for nearly a century while courts
applied "discovery" principles indiscriminately to all unceded tribal
lands, whether or not acknowledged by treaty. Thus, for example, the
Court's 1850 decision in Gaines v. Nicholson133 described treaties as
merely "confirming" tribes' right of occupancy, rather than as waiving
discovery and substituting complete title under European law. 134 In 1902,
the Court held in Minnesota v. Hitchcock 35 that the administrative power
of Congress over unceded tribal lands never confirmed by treaty was as
great as its power over lands expressly reserved by treaty. "[I]n order to
create a reservation, it is not necessary that there should be a formal ces-
sion or a formal act setting apart a particular tract," the Court argued. 136
"It is enough that from what has been done there results a certain defined
tract appropriated to certain purposes."' 137 The Court held forty years
later that, when asserting a tribal interest in land, the United States' claim
need not be based "upon a treaty, statute, or other formal government
action," since the tribal right arises in all cases from original occu-
pancy. 138
The courts' failure to distinguish confirmed from unconfirmed tribal
tenure went largely unchallenged as long as the context in which the issue
131. 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) at 749 (emphasis added).
132. Id. at 755 (emphasis added). Can an argument be made that U.S. recognition, by treaty. of
some tribes was an implied recognition of the state character of tribes, and hence waived title-by-
discovery as applied to all tribes? "Recognition" of tribal tenure is analogous to the principal that a
non-tribal treaty "'vests" private property rights in the fifth amendment sense. See Chae Chan Ping v.
United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581. 609 (1888): Society for the Propogation
of the Gospel in Foreign Parts v. Town of New Haven. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 206. 218 (1823).
133. 50 U.S. (9 How.) 356 (1850).
134. Id.at364.
135. 185 U.S. 373 (1902).
136. Id. at 390.
137. Id.
138. United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R.. 314 U.S. 339,347 (1941)
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arose was the expansion of federal management power. When tribes
began to sue the United States in their own right for possession or for
damages, the distinction was revived and eventually used against them.
In the 1935 case of United States v. Creek Nation, 39 the Creek Nation
sought fifth amendment compensation for federal mismanagement and
disposal of tribal lands granted, by treaty, in the Indian Territory. The
Supreme Court agreed that an assertion of trusteeship or plenary power
does not "enable the United States to give the tribal lands to others, or to
appropriate them to its own purposes, without rendering, or assuming an
obligation to render, just compensation for them; for that 'would not be
an exercise of guardianship, but an act of confiscation.' "140
Three years later, in United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 141 the Court ex-
panded this rule to compensate the Shoshone Tribe's interest in minerals
and timber involuntarily converted to the use of another tribe by the
United States. 142 The Shoshone case was significant because it involved
original unceded tribal territory acknowledged by treaty, while the land in
Creek Nation had been held under a federal patent.
In United States v. Santa Fe Pacific Railroad,143 decided in 1941, the
United States attempted to eject the railroad from lands claimed by the
Hualpai tribe by original occupancy alone. According to the Court, origi-
nal occupancy alone, not voluntarily ceded and not extinguished by the
United States, was sufficient to create "Indian title." 144 Congressional
power to extinguish this right was "supreme," however, and not subject
to judicial review. 145
139. 295U.S. 103 (1935).
140. Id. at 110 (quoting Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 110, 113 (1919)).
141. 304U.S. 111 (1938).
142. The Court stated:
Minerals and standing timber are constituent elements of the land itself. For all practical pur-
poses, the tribe owned the land. Grants of land subject to the Indian title by the United States,
which had only the naked fee, would transfer no beneficial interest. The right of perpetual and
exclusive occupancy of the land is not less valuable than full title in fee.
Id. at 116 (citations omitted). The Court distinguished United States v. Cook, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 591
(1873) (discussed in note 128 supra), describing it to have concerned only the right of the United
States to protect the collective tribal interest in land from unauthorized removals of timber by individ-
ual Indians. 304 U.S. at 118. The remainderman theory, in principle, was dead.
143. 314 U.S. 339(1941).
144. Id. at 345,347.
145. 314 U.S. at 347. Ironically, the decision to some extent turned on whether either of two
nineteenth century efforts by federal agents to remove the tribe from this land had been authorized by
Congress. If authorized, the Supreme Court concluded, the removal left the Hualpai without a rem-
edy at law. Only the United States may extinguish a tribe's "right of occupancy," Justice Douglas
wrote for the Court, "[a]nd whether it be done by treaty, by the sword, by purchase, by the exercise
of complete dominion adverse to the right of occupancy, or otherwise, its justness is not open to
inquiry in the courts." Id. See also id. at 350-51. In fact, the Court decided against Hualpai right of
occupancy but on the grounds that, by voluntarily accepting a reservation, the tribe had ceded its
original occupancy of the property in question. Id. at 357-58.
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A situation similar to Santa Fe Pacific Railroad was presented in Tee-
Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 146 decided in 1955. A fifth amendment
claim for just compensation arose out of the United States' removal of
timber from Alaska lands anciently occupied by the tribe but never ac-
knowledged or confirmed by treaty or legislation. "Where the Congress
by treaty or other agreement has declared that thereafter Indians were to
hold the lands permanently, compensation must be paid for subsequent
taking," the Supreme Court noted, 147 affirming the results in Creek Na-
tion and Shoshone. In other cases the tribe could have only "Indian ti-
tle," which
means mere possession not specifically recognized as ownership by Con-
gress. After conquest they were permitted to occupy portions of territory
over which they had previously exercised "sovereignty," as we use that
term. This is not a property right but amounts to a right of occupancy which
the sovereign grants and protects against intrusion by third parties but which
right of occupancy may be terminated and such lands fully disposed of by
the sovereign itself without any legally enforceable obligation to compen-
sate the Indians. 148
In Tee-Hit-Ton, the Court thus combined in a single rule the principal
of Mitchel v. United States with a polar principle from the 1874 case of
United States v. Cook. 149 Tribal title that is somehow adequately "recog-
nized" by federal law is property in the fifth amendment sense, and in
dealing with it Congress is subject to the usual requirements of due pro-
cess and just compensation for takings. 150 "Unrecognized" tribal lands
claims, however, exist at the pleasure of Congress and may be abolished
without compensation. 151 But here the apparent symmetry and simplicity
of the formula breaks down. Given the perverse variety of means that the
United States historically has used in choosing to tolerate, confirm, or
146. 348 U.S. 272(1955).
147. Id. at 277-78 (footnote omitted).
148. Id. at 279 (emphasis added).
149. 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 591 (1874) (discussed in note 128 supra).
150. For recent applications of this principle, see United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians. 448
U.S, 371 (1980), and Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73. 84 (1977). In Dela-
ware the Court held that members of a group no longer officially recognized as part of a tribe were not
entitled to compensation. "[Tlhe Kansas Delawares are not a recognized tribal entity, but are simply
individual Indians with no vested rights in any tribal property." Id. at 85.
151. Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co.. 337 U.S. 86 (1949). The Indian Claims Commission Act.
ch. 959, 60 Stat. 1049 (1946) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 70-70w (1976)), created a statutory remedy
for tribal land claims previously not recognized by the courts under the fifth amendment. Some tribes
contend that the Act also worked to cut off or reduce fifth amendment claims by purporting to make
litigation before the Commission the tribes' exclusive remedy for all land disputes, whether arising
under the Constitution or merely as matters of conscience. See Six Nations Confederacy v. Andrus.
610 F.2d 996 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Oglala Sioux Tribe v. United States, No. 80-1878 (8th Cir. June I.
1980).
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secure tribal land claims, not to mention the absence of any conventional
terminology in treaties or statutes, 152 "recognition" must be adduced
case by case. There can be little hope of consistency or predictability.
In the days when all those multifarious "reservations," "exceptions,"
"set aparts," and other terminological devices were being used to record
agreements with the tribes, the leading American decisions on tribal ten-
ure were Johnson v. M'Intosh153 and Mitchel v. United States,154 both
agreeing that tribes' rights were "as sacred as the fee-simple of the
whites" whether or not they were confirmed by treaty. 155 Surely the
tribes could not have known that the form of words in a treaty, or the
absence of certain words, might someday retroactively be held to deprive
them of legally enforceable rights. If the soul of property law is certainty
and security, then tribes have just cause to complain of a nation whose
laws, at the time tribes partitioned their lands, declared that what re-
mained unceded would always be theirs, but subsequently were inter-
preted to mean that the tribes might keep only that which had been set
aside by words and rituals the necessity of which was revealed only after
it was too late to use them. The lone consolation of the recognition doc-
trine has been that those tribes fortunate enough to have the magic words
in their treaties would enjoy compensable title in their reserved lands. It
will be seen, however, that even this hope is challenged by the Montana
decision. 156
G. The Rules of Liberal Construction
When law encounters vague facts, ambiguous instruments, or inconsis-
tent terminology, resolution of the parties' rights commonly depends
upon a rule of construction or a presumption. Such rules assign the bur-
den of caution, foresight, or-after the fact-the hardship of error to one
class of litigants in favor of another. The assignment may reflect assump-
tions about who may best or most cheaply bear the cost of avoiding future
ambiguities, once charged by law with that burden. The assignment may
represent considerations of equity, as in giving the benefit of the doubt to
historically under-represented or disadvantaged groups. In the last resort,
an assignment of the burden of caution may be arbitrary. The goal of
increased certainty and predictability of the law demands that the place-
ment of the burden be consistent.
152. See note 25 supra.
153. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (discussed in notes 36-41 supra).
154. 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711 (1835) (discussed in notes 129-132 and accompanying text supra).
155. Mitchel, 34 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 746; see Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574.
156. See notes 329-335 and accompanying text infra.
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Almost from the beginning, American courts have been sensitive to the
special problems of Indian treaties. Not only were these instruments vari-
ously worded, often in terms at odds with conventional legal usage, but it
was all too apparent that documentation in English placed the tribes at the
mercy of foreign interpreters and their own limited command of that lan-
guage.1 57 It was a simple matter for an unscrupulous negotiator to take
advantage of a tribe's lack of ability in Anglo-American law and the En-
glish language to produce "agreements" the legal effect of which might
be the opposite of that intended by the Indians. The Supreme Court recog-
nized these problems in Worcester v. Georgia 58 and established two re-
lated canons of treaty construction. First,"[hlow the words of the treaty
were understood by this unlettered people, rather than their critical mean-
ing, should form the rule of construction," 1 59 so that extrinsic evidence
of the tribe's desires or intent may supersede the usual meaning of terms
of art. Second,
[t]he language used in treaties with the Indians should never be construed to
their prejudice. If words be made use of which are susceptible of a more
extended meaning than their plain import, as connected with the tenor of the
treaty, they should be considered as used only in the latter sense. 160
In other words, any treaty terms susceptible of more than one interpreta-
tion should be construed against any surrender of the tribe's rights.
As a practical matter, then, the United States bore the burden of clearly
documenting the tribes' consent to part with their rights. Ideally this also
could help put tribal negotiators unambiguously on notice when they were
asked to surrender those rights. As the Supreme Court noted:
[I]t cannot be supposed that the Indians were alert to exclude by formal
words every inference which might militate against or defeat the declared
purpose of themselves and the Government, even if it could be supposed
that they had the intelligence to foresee the "double sense" which might
some time be urged against them. 161
157. In international practice multilingual versions of the treaties would have been used. but in
the 19th century few Indian languages were written and courts have been reluctant to accept tribes'
oral versions when they differ from the official written text. For one such case history. see United
States v. Bouchard, 464 F. Supp. 1316 (W.D. Wis. 1978). We are aware ofonly one bilingual Indian
treaty, the Micmac treaty of 1752, printed in English and in French. a language already commonly
spoken by the tribe. See Treaty, or, Articles of Peace and Friendship Renewed, between Governor
Hopson and the Micmac Indians. November 22, 1752 (printed at Halifax in 1753 by John Bushnell
and known from copies at the New York Historical Society and New York Public Library). reprinted
in part in A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF TIlE ENGLISH COLONIAL TREATIES VITH THE AMERICAN INDIANS 30 (H
De Puy ed. 1917).
158. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
159. Id. at 582 (McLean, J., concurring); see also id. at 522-53.
160. hl. at 582 (McLean, J., concurring).
161. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564.577 (1908).
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The Court also was sensitive to the possibility that tribes might too readily
part with their rights out of fear or in response to threats, a danger partly
ameliorated by reading treaties strictly against the United States' interest.
"The parties are not on an equal footing, and that inequality is to be made
good by the superior justice which looks only to the substance of the
right," the Court explained in 1886, "without regard to technical rules
framed under a system of municipal jurisprudence, formulating the rights
and obligations of private persons, equally subject to the same laws." 162
These principles have not absolved tribes entirely from the premise of
international treaty law that courts "are not at liberty to dispense with any
of the conditions or requirements of the treaty, or to take away any quali-
fication or integral part of any stipulation, upon any notion of equity or
general convenience, or substantial justice." 163 Every part of the treaty is
to be given effect, but in that light most consistent with the Indians' inter-
ests and apparent purposes. The rules of liberal construction are thus con-
sistent with the notion at international law that nations part with the inci-
dents of sovereignty only by their express consent, 164 so that any grant of
rights or powers to another nation by treaty is to be construed strictly
against the grantee. At least when dividing their original sovereignty and
territory with the United States, then, tribes should be taken to have lost
only that which they have given freely and unambiguously.
When the principal controls on federal/tribal relations passed from bi-
lateral treaties to unilateral legislation in the late nineteenth century,
courts were quick to extend the rules of liberal construction to the inter-
pretation of congressional acts. Indeed, during the "plenary power" doc-
trine's turn-of-the-century zenith, 165 statutory construction was virtually
the only check on Congress that Indians could invoke. "It is not within
the power of the courts to overrule the judgment of Congress," the Su-
preme Court maintained in In re Heff, 166 but "[i]t is true there may be a
presumption that no radical departure is intended, and courts may wisely
insist that the purpose of Congress be made clear by its legislation
... ,,167 So, too, of federal legislation purporting to extinguish tribal
possession and use of part of its reservation. "That Congress could have
effected such an extinguishment is not doubted," the Court concluded in
United States v. Sante Fe Pacific Railroad, 168 "[b]ut an extinguishment
162. Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119 U.S. 1,28 (1886).
163. United States v. Choctaw Nation, 179 U.S. 494, 533 (1900).
164. See United States v. Shoshone Tribe of Indians, 304 U.S. 111, 116, 118 (1938); United
States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381-83 (1905); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1899).
165. See generally notes 78-81 and accompanying text supra.
166. 197 U.S. 488,499 (1905).
167. Id.
168. 314 U.S. 339,353-54 (1941).
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cannot be lightly implied in view of the avowed solicitude of the Federal
Government for the welfare of its Indian wards." 169 Hence, as applied to
legislation, construing ambiguities in tribes' favor was reconceived as a
matter of deference to Congress' overall benevolent intentions, rather
than-as in Worcester-an assumption that the United States would
sometimes act in bad faith. 170
Indian treaties and Indian legislation tend to be silent or to speak only
in general terms about the nature and scope of tribal self-government. 171
Hence, resolving ambiguities in tribes' favor has operated to slow state
and federal encroachment on tribal lands and jurisdiction. The doctrine of
liberal construction was, in practical effect, the tribes' tenth amendment.
But, just as judicial vindication of federal social programs as exercises of
the commerce power have weakened the principle of reserved state pow-
ers since the New Deal, Montana v. United States culminates a judicial
assault on liberal construction of Indian laws and treaties that began in
1978.172
II. TITLE TO RIVERBEDS AND TIDELANDS: MONTANA'S
ANTECEDENTS
A. Navigability and the Golden Age of State Rights
The Supreme Court's 1824 decision in Gibbons v. Ogden173 estab-
lished the preemptive federal regulatory prerogative over waterborne
169. Id. See also Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977); DeCoteau v. District
County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975): Mattz v. Arnett. 412 U.S. 481 (1973): Carpenter v. Shaw, 280
U.S. 363 (1930): Choate v. Trapp. 224 U.S. 665 (1 912).
170. Although thus protected from injury by the mere implication of special federal Indian legis-
lation, tribes have not been immune from implied inclusion in general federal laws governing taxes.
Superintendent of Five Civilized Tribes v. Commissioner, 295 U.S. 418 (1935); Choteau v. Bumet.
283 U.S. 691 (1931); from reclamation and environmental protection, Federal Power Comm'n v.
Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 116-17 (1960); United States v. White, 508 F.2d 453 (8th
Cir. 1974): or from labor relations. Navajo Tribe v. NLRB, 288 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1961). At least
since citizenship was conferred on Indians unilaterally in 1924, the courts have reasoned that an
exemption from legislation generally applicable to the territory and people of the United States must
be found in the express language, or at least the compelling implications, of some treaty or statute.
See. e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974): Squire v. Capoeman. 351 U.S. 1(1956). The
Squire Court's reading of an implied federal tax exemption in the General Allotment Act. ch. 119. 24
Stat. 388 (1887), is reviewed in Barsh, Issues in Federal. State, and Tribal Taxation of Reservation
Wealth: A Survey and Economic Critique, 54 WASH L. REV. 531, 545 (1979). Ironically, then.
current canons of construction render tribal rights more vulnerable to legislative extinction by impli-
cation when Congress isn't thinking about Indians when it acts than when Congress is thinking about
them.
171. Indian treaties are collected in INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 37.
172. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978): see notes 304-306 and accom-
panying text itfra.
173. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I (1824).
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commerce, extending even to "[t]he deep streams which penetrate our
country in every direction, pass through the interior of almost every State
in the Union, and furnish the means of exercising" the states' right to
engage in domestic and foreign trade. 174 But the power described in Gib-
bons was supervisory, not proprietary, leaving the states for the time
being in undisputed possession of the title to submerged lands and to the
waters and fish moving over them. It was not until 1842, in Martin v.
Waddell's Lessee, 175 that the power of the states to dispose of submerged
lands was challenged.
Martin was more of a fishing case than a title case. It involved a 100
acre tract of oyster beds under the navigable Raritan River and Bay in
New Jersey. The area had been part of a seventeenth-century royal patent
to the Duke of York delegating, as was customary at the time, both gov-
ernmental and proprietary powers to the patentee. In 1702 the patentee
surrendered all of his governmental authority to the Crown, retaining, in
general terms, only the property. His heirs deeded the oyster bed to Wad-
dell in 1834, whereupon his lessee sued Martin for ejectment, who
claimed under an 1824 deed from the state. The issue was whether owner-
ship of the river and bay attached to the governmental capacity of the
colony of New Jersey, and so passed to the government of the state after
the Revolution, or whether it was part of the private property retained by
the Crown's patentee in 1702. From these peculiar facts, Chief Justice
Taney's Supreme Court fashioned sweeping new doctrine.
The Duke of York's patent from the Crown did not include the oyster
beds by express terms. Should a grant of them nevertheless be implied
from their location within the metes and bounds of the patent? Chief Jus-
tice Taney's review of English decisions convinced him that at common
law the Crown always held the navigable waters of the realm "in trust"
for public use, and lacked power to deed private rights or monopolies to
fisheries. 176 Hence, it was reasonable to assume that the letters patent
merely delegated this trust to the Duke of York in his temporary capacity
as chief executive of the New Jersey colony, that this trust had reverted to
the Crown in 1702, and that the Duke and his heirs never acquired any
private proprietary right to fisheries or submerged lands. As was noted by
Chief Justice Taney,
Indeed, it could not well have been otherwise; for the men who first formed
the English settlements could not have been expected to encounter the many
hardships that unavoidably attended their emigration to the new world, and
to people the banks of its bays and rivers, if the land under the water at their
174. Id. at 195.
175. 41U.S. (16Pet.)367(1842).
176. Id.at409-10.
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very doors was liable to immediate appropriation by another as private prop-
erty; and the settler upon the fast land thereby excluded from its enjoyment,
and unable to take a shellfish from its bottom, or fasten there a stake, or
even bathe in its waters, without becoming a trespasser upon the rights of
another. 177
Having decided that the Duke and his heirs had had no title under the
common law to grant to Waddell, it remained for the Chief Justice to
explain if and how Martin acquired good title from the state. Taney ob-
served:
[W]hen the revolution took place the people of each State became them-
selves sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute right to all their
navigable waters and the soils under them for their own common use, sub-
ject only to the rights since surrendered by the Constitution to the general
government. 178
State power to grant submerged lands away in fee to individuals was con-
firmed by long usage, 79 Taney concluded, hence the state's patentee had
good title. 180
The problem of title to submerged lands returned to the Court three
years later in Pollard v. Hagan. 181 In Pollard, however, the issue was the
power of the United States, rather than that of a state, to make private
grants of submerged land. Originally submerged but later drained and re-
claimed, the land in controversy lay on the shore of Mobile Bay in Ala-
bama.
Justice McKinley maintained for the Court that the United States could
hold unappropriated lands within Alabama only as a temporary trustee,
exercising only those administrative powers necessarily incident to distri-
buting the lands to the state and its citizens. 182 In the execution of this
trust, moreover, the United States was disabled from exceeding its consti-
tutional powers, or from depriving the state of any prerogative reserved to
177. Id. at 414.
178. Id. at 410.
179. Id. at416-17.
180. It may seem paradoxical that the Crown's "trust" in submerged lands and fisheries required
the protection of public access and the defeat of claims like that of Waddell's lessee, whereas the
state's public "trust" in the same lands authorized private subdivision. Indeed, there were two dis-
senters. Justices Thompson and Baldwin, who disputed Chief Justice Taney's reading of English
precedents. "The true rule on the subject," they explained. "is that prima facie a fishery in a naviga-
ble river is common, and he who sets up an exclusive right must show title by grant or prescription."
Id. at 424 (Thompson, J., dissenting). The Crown might grant private rights, but the burden of proof
fell on the grantee to show express intent.
181. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
182. Id. at 220-29; see notes 94-104 and accompanying text supra.
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it by the equal footing doctrine or the tenth amendment. 183 Although the
Constitution gives Congress preemptive authority to regulate navigation,
Justice McKinley reasoned that "[t]he shores of navigable waters, and
the soils under them, were not granted by the Constitution to the United
States, but were. reserved to the States respectively." 184 Noting the Mar-
tin Court's finding that the original states had treated the beds of navig-
able waters as theirs to keep or grant as an incident of sovereignty, Justice
McKinley concluded that the United States could not constitutionally de-
feat this state right by granting away submerged lands during the period
of its trusteeship. 185
Justice Field's 1891 opinion in Packer v. Bird 86 implicitly extended
Pollard beyond the state-cession area to lands that the United States had
acquired by other means. 187 Packer involved conflicting claims to an is-
land in the Sacramento River in California. In the course of determining
the validity of those claims, the Court held that the 1857 federal land
grant that was the alleged basis of title in fact had conveyed none of the
lands beneath the Sacramento River, as the portion of the river bordering
the property was navigable. 188
The major issue addressed by the Court in Packer was whether Pol-
lard, which previously had been applied only to tidelands, also applied to
navigable rivers above the "ebb and flow" of the tide. "Navigable in
fact" had been the test of federal jurisdiction in admiralty since Propeller
Genessee Chief v. Fitzhugh (The Genessee Chief),189 and Justice Field
reasoned that the scope of Pollard ought to be coextensive with the navi-
gation power of the United States. 190 The irony here should not be
missed. The more extensive the federal navigation power, according to
Justice Field's formula, the less extensive the federal interest in the public
domain. The very waterways over which Congress enjoys preemptive
power are those which vest automatically in the state upon admission.
Pollard was tested again within the year by two challenges to the
power of the United States to have confirmed by patent, after California
183. 44 U.S: (3 How.) at 228-29.
184. Id. at 230.
185. Id.
186. 137 U.S. 661 (1891).
187. See id. at 671. On its face, the Pollard rule was limited to new states carved out of the
western lands claimed by the original members of the Union under colonial charters and patents but
deeded to the United States by express terms of trust following the Revolution. Pollard, 44 U.S. (3
How.) at 228,See also Weberv. Board of State Harbor Comm'rs, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 57 (1873) (an
earlier opinion by Justice Field).
188. 137 U.S. at 672-73.
189. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 442, 454-56 (1851). See also The Steamer Daniel Ball v. United States
(The Daniel Ball), 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).
190. 137 U.S. at 671.
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statehood, Mexican land grants expressly conveying interests in San
Francisco Bay tidelands. So soon after his sweeping extension of the Pol-
lard doctrine in Packer, Justice Field reneged: "that doctrine cannot
apply to such lands as had been previously granted to other parties by the
former government, or subjected to trusts which would require their dis-
position in some other way."' 19 1 Thus, the United States could patent
tidelands in the execution of its administrative "trust," under the Treaty
of Guadelupe Hidalgo, to protect the property of former Mexican citi-
zens. 192 As explained by the Court, "[t]he duty of the government and its
power in the execution of its treaty obligations . . . were superior to any
subsequently acquired rights or claims of the State of California, or of
individuals."193 This exception to the rule that tidelands vest automati-
cally in new states was confirmed and expanded only months later in an
opinion penned by Justice Lamar. 194 Noting Justice Field's reliance on
the United States' treaty promise "to protect all rights of property in that
territory emanating from the Mexican government," Justice Lamar con-
cluded that "[irrespective of any such provision in the treaty, the obliga-
tions resting upon the United States in this respect, under the principles of
international law, would have been the same." 1 95 Once one exception to
Pollard had been recognized, the Supreme Court wasted no time finding
others.
B. State Rights Crumble: Shively v. Bowlby
As the nineteenth century drew to a close, accumulated land with-
drawals from new western states and public pressure for conservation and
reclamation had created a federal public domain empire unlike anything
Chief Justice Taney would ever have imagined or tolerated. If one thing
was plain from Pollard v. Hagan, however, it was that the United States
loses control of lands beneath navigable waters upon admission of the
territory as a state. Now that federal policy was delaying statehood
throughout the west by decades, 196 the greatest danger to state rights was
a federal grant prior to admission.
That problem was laid before the Supreme Court in bold relief in 1894.
Shively v. Bowlby 197 was a dispute over the tide flats of the Columbia
191. San Francisco City & County v. Le Roy, 138 U.S. 656, 671 (1891).
192. Id. at 667.
193. Id. at 671.
194. Knightv. United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161 (1891).
195. Id. at 183-84.
196. See E. POMEROY, THE TERRITORIES AND THE UNITED STATES 1861-1890 at xii. 2 (2d ed.
1969).
197. 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
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River at Astoria, Oregon. While Oregon was still a territory, the United
States had patented lots along the shore extending by their terms through
the tidelands. Upon admission, the new state deeded the lots to others,
contending that the United States could not act during the period of its
territorial "trust" to defeat the interest of the future state.
The author of the opinion was not Justice Field, but Justice Gray. It
was apparent from the outset that a doctrinal turning point had been
reached. The Court endorsed the view of the dissenters in Martin v. Wad-
dell's Lessee as to the power of the Crown at common law to grant tide-
lands. 198 It stated: "[A] grant from the sovereign of land bounded by the
sea, or by any navigable tide water, does not pass any title below high
water mark, unless either the language of the grant, or long usage under
it, clearly indicates that such was the intention." 199 This itself was not
revolutionary. It was nothing more than what Pollard had found true of
the practices of most of the states after independence. Where Shively
really departed from Pollard was in locating this sovereign authority to
grant submerged lands within the Constitution. The Pollard Court could
find no constitutional foundation for federal ownership of tidelands and
limited federal authority to the execution of treaties and compacts. 200
Shively, however, referred to the property clause and the growing legal
tradition, since American Insurance Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton,20' of im-
plying from it vast powers of federal governance. 202
Prior to the admission of a territory to statehood, while the territory
remained property of the United States, the whole sovereign power of
granting submerged lands remained federal. 203 This disposal power did
not flow from a trust for the benefit of the future state; therefore it could
be used to accomplish an array of more remote public purposes. Never-
198. See generally note 180 supra (discussion of Martin dissent).
199. 152 U.S. at 13 (emphasis added). See also Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.)
367,423-24 (1842).
200. See text accompanying notes 99-103 supra.
201. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511(1828) (discussed in notes 83-85 and accompanying text supra).
202. The result of this legal tradition is reflected in the following statement by the Shively Court:
By the Constitution, as is now well settled, the United States, having rightfully acquired the
Territories, and being the only government which can impose laws upon them, have the entire
dominion and sovereignty, national and municipal, Federal and state, over all the Territories, so
long as they remain in a territorial condition.
We cannot doubt, therefore, that Congress has the power to make grants of lands below high
water mark of navigable waters in any Territory of the United States, whenever it becomes
necessary to do so in order to perform international obligations, or to effect the improvement of
such lands for the promotion and convenience of commerce with foreign nations and among the
several States, or to carry out other public purposes appropriate to the objects of which the
United States hold the Territory.
152 U.S. at 48 (citations omitted).
203. See note 202 supra.
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theless, the Court warned in Shively, it had been the policy of the United
States to forego the exercise of this power and to provide that submerged
lands "shall not be granted away during the period of territorial govern-
ment; but, unless in case of some international duty or public exigency,
shall be held by the United States in trust for the future States.' 204 This
reformulation explained federal lands management practice since Pollard
as the reflection of a discretionary practice that Congress might change,
rather than as obedience to a constitutional limitation on federal authority.
As for the case at hand, Shively was decided in favor of the state's grantee
after all: the federal grantee's patent "contain[ed] nothing indicating any
intention on the part of Congress to depart from its settled policy of not
granting to individuals lands under tide waters or navigable rivers.' 205
The federal grantee presumably would have succeeded if his grant had
been more explicit.
Having disposed of Pollard's limitation of federal power to grant sub-
merged lands prior to statehood, the next step was to reconsider federal
power to retain submerged lands after statehood. Five years after Shively,
the Court in United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co.20 6 upheld
the power of the United States to enjoin a state government from authoriz-
ing diversions of water from a navigable stream. The Court was uncer-
tain, however, whether this power flowed from federal regulatory
preemption under the commerce clause or from federal ownership of na-
vigable rivers under the property clause. 207
The confusion surrounding federal powers over waterbeds remained
unresolved until 1935. In Borax Consolidated Ltd. v. City of Los Ange-
les, 20 8 the corporate defendant traced its title to Los Angeles harbor tide-
lands to an 1881 post-statehood federal grant. The city based its claim to
the tidelands on a subsequent grant from the state. Citing Pollard, the
Supreme Court held unequivocally that the tidelands had passed to Cali-
fornia upon its admission to the Union, hence the federal grant was
void.20 9 The same year, however, the Court reaffirmed the United States'
204. 152 U.S. at 50.
205. Id. at 51.
206. 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
207. The Court stated:
[I]n the absence of specific authority from Congress a State cannot by its legislation destroy the
right of the United States, as the owner of lands bordering on a stream, to the continued flow of
its waters: so far at least as may be necessary for the beneficial uses of the government property.
...[T]he jurisdiction of the General Government over interstate commerce and its natural
highways vest in that Government the right to take all needed measures to preserve the naviga-
bility of the navigable water courses of the country even against state action.
ld. at 703 (emphasis added).
208. 296 U.S. 10(1935).
209. Id. at 16.
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authority to use public lands orders to withdraw the beds of non-navigable
waterways indefinitely-for bird sanctuaries, in the particular case.210
At last the Court's various twists, turns, and doublings-back on the
theme of Pollard had assumed some coherence. Prior to statehood, the
United States holds title to the beds of navigable waters with the power,
under the property clause, to dispose of these lands for legitimate public
purposes. 21' Because the policy of Congress has been to avoid such
grants, 212 claimants under federal instruments bear the burden of showing
specific intent to convey more than just the fast lands. At statehood, the
title to lands underlying navigable waters passes to the state, and is sub-
ject only to the paramount power of the United States to control such
waters pursuant to the commerce clause.213 After statehood, the United
States may retain complete title to submerged lands not granted to the
state at statehood, committed to a proper public purpose, 214 but may dis-
pose of these retained lands only to the state.215
III. TRIBAL INTERESTS IN SUBMERGED LANDS
A. From Winans to Brewer-Elliott
The foregoing discussions of tribal land tenure and title to the beds of
navigable waterways come together in tribal/state disputes over the own-
ership of water, fisheries, and submerged lands. The case record is spo-
radic, is not entirely consistent, and is dominated by peculiar -fact situa-
tions. It may, therefore, be appropriate to begin with a few general
theoretical considerations as a frame of reference.
The threshold question in any contest over tribal interests in submerged
lands should be whether the tribe claims as the original occupant or as the
United States' grantee. 216 By the rules of liberal construction, 217 a tribe
claiming as the original occupant is entitled to a presumption against any
implied loss of any part of its property, by treaty or by legislation. In
other words, the state or private claimant must show where the United
States expressly purchased or confiscated the right or interest at issue.
Where the tribe asserts some kind of "recognition, ' 2 1 8 moreover, its
210. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 29 (1935).
211. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 48 (1894).
212. Id. at 48-50.
213. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935); United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irriga-
tion Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899).
214. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 29 (1935).
215. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 228-29 (1845).
216. See part I.A. supra.
217. See generally part I.G. supra.
218. See generally part I.F. supra.
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original interest in the property may be immune from unconsented federal
takings and can pass to private parties only by express sale.
If the tribe claims by way of a grant from the United States, it still does
not follow necessarily that the rule of Pollard v. Hagan2 19 and Shively v.
Bowlby, 220 that grants are presumed not to include the beds of navigable
waters, applies. These cases involved rules for construing the validity and
intent of federal grants to private persons, and thus do not apply to any
trust created by treaty. As the Supreme Court of Iowa succinctly stated
the problem a century ago in a case involving the reservation, by treaty,
of riparian lands for individual Sac and Fox "half-breeds":
The grant to the half-breeds, was to them as persons, and not as a political
body. The political jurisdiction remained in the United States. Had the grant
been to them as a political society, it would have been a question of bound-
ary between nations or states, and then the line would have been the medium
filurn aquae, as it is now between Iowa and Illinois.22'
If the grant of territory to a tribe, by treaty, is to them as a body politic in
their collective and governmental capacity, it should be construed, like
other intergovernmental territorial grants within the American federal
system, to pass the "sovereign" control of submerged lands together
with the enclosed fast lands. Pollard and Shively both recognized the
principle that this incident of sovereignty passes to states automatically
along with federal grants of territory within their borders-not because
they are state governments, but because they are governments.2 22 The
same principle should apply to grants to tribes.
Lastly, it will be recalled that both Pollard and Shively deemed the
presumption against the inclusion of submerged lands in private grants to
be fair because it had been, the Court believed, the rule in the colonists'
mother country. 223 This reasoning invokes the policy of continuity of ex-
pectations in property law, but it is entirely inappropriate as applied to
tribes. Certainly it makes no sense to apply a canon of construction to
Indian treaties for no better reason than that non-Indians probably are fa-
miliar with it. To do so would violate the consistent tradition of our law
since Worcester v. Georgia22 4 of referring the construction of Indian trea-
219. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845) (discussed in notes 94-108 and accompanying text supra).
220. 152 U.S. 1 (1894) (discussed in part 11. B. supra).
221. Haight v. City of Keokuk, 4 Iowa 199. 213 (1857).followed in Barney v. Keokuk. 94 U.S.
324. 337 (1877), cited with approval in Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma. 397 U.S. 620. 631 n.8
(1970).
222. See Shivelv. 152 U.S. at 29-30: Pollard, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 215-16. 222.
223. Shivelv, 152 U.S. at 52; Pollard. 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 218.
224. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (discussed in notes 158-160 and accompanying text supra).
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ties to the expectations and understanding of the Indians, and not of the
United States. With these concerns in mind, we may turn to the cases.
In United States v. Winans,225 the federal government, acting as "trus-
tee" for the Yakima tribes, successfully enjoined non-Indians from erect-
ing "fish wheels" on the Columbia River where they would interfere
with tribal fishing. The tribe's treaty expressly reserved the right to fish
"in common" with citizens, and the Supreme Court read this as a re-
tained property right rather than as merely a right of access to or participa-
tion in the general fishery. Fishing was "not much less necessary to the
existence of the Indians than the atmosphere they breathed," 226 the Court
observed. Hence, under the rules of liberal construction, the right to fish
must be construed broadly to preserve it against injury or reduction. 227
The Yakima interest in the treaty fishery was great enough to secure both
access to the fish and a secure supply offish to their territory-ownership
of the fish in all but name.
Three years later in Winters v. United States228 the Court had occasion
to determine whether an 1888 "agreement" between the United States
and tribes settling on the Fort Belknap Reservation in Montana had
granted or reserved tribal ownership of the waters flowing over their land.
The Court again took the view that the water rights were essential and had
been the tribe's to begin with, and therefore should be presumed to be the
tribe's still. The Court stated:
The Indians had command of the lands and the waters-command of all
their beneficial use, whether kept for hunting, "and grazing roving herds of
stock," or turned to agriculture and the arts of civilization. Did they give up
all this? Did they reduce the area of their occupation and give up the waters
which made it valuable or adequate? 229
"By a rule of interpretation of agreements and treaties with the Indi-
ans, ambiguities occuring will be resolved from the standpoint of the In-
dians, "230 the Court continued. Not being expressly ceded by the tribe in
its 1888 "agreement," the Court concluded that the waters had been re-
tained for tribal use.
Both Winans and Winters involved tribal territories originally set apart
225. 198U.S. 371 (1905).
226. Id.at381.
227. Id. at 381-82. Cf. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979) (allocates the opportunity to harvest fish at traditional tribal fishing
grounds but stops short of saying that the tribes own a portion of the fish stocks or the waters in which
they spawn).
228. 207 U.S. 564(1908).
229. Id. at 576.
230. Id. at 576.
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by treaties prior to statehood. Even after the rule of Shively, then, title to
the riverbeds could not yet have vested in the state. The issue of riverbed
title in a reservation created after statehood came before the Court in Don-
nelly v. United Sates.231 In Donnelly, a criminal prosecution, the issue
was whether the situs was within the Hoopa Valley Reservation and
therefore subject to federal rather than state jurisdiction. Donnelly's
crime occurred on the bank of the Klamath River below the high water
mark, where the river passed through the reservation. The reservation had
been created, not by treaty, but by an executive order more than forty
years after California statehood withdrawing public lands on either side
of the river. Since the river was non-navigable, however, there was no
problem with vesting of state title as long as the United States retained
technical title. According to the Court:
It seems to us clear that if the United States was the owner of the river bed, a
reasonable construction of [the executive order] requires that the river be
considered as included within the reservation. Indeed, in view of all the
circumstances, it would be absurd to treat the order as intended to include
the uplands to the width of one mile on each side of the river, and at the
same time to exclude the river. As a matter of history it plainly appears that
the Klamath Indians established themselves along the river in order to gain a
subsistence by fishing.232
Donnelly followed Winans and Winters, then, to the extent of giving
great weight to the economic importance of the watercourse to the tribe.
Donnelly differed because the tribe exercised, at best, a late-created right
to the use of the public domain rather than the kind of title or the equiva-
lent of title that the tribes in Winans and Winters enjoyed in their unceded
lands and waters.
The Court's thinking crystallized in 1918 in Alaska Pacific Fisheries v.
United States.233 As in Winans, the controversy surrounded non-Indians'
erection of a fish trap in waters claimed and fished by the tribe. The Met-
lakatla band had emigrated from British Columbia to southeastern Alaska
in 1887 at the invitation of the United States, settling in the Annette Is-
lands. An 1891 Act of Congress had withdrawn "the body of lands
known as Annette Islands" from entry or sale "until otherwise provided
by law" as a "reservation" for the Metlakatlans.2 34 Interior Department
officials maintained that the withdrawal was meant to include the islands'
boundary waters and sub-tidal lands, and hence its tidal salmon fisheries.
231. 228U.S. 243 (1913).
232. Id. at 259.
233. 248U.S.78(1918).
234. Id. at 86-87.
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Following Winans, Winters and Donnelly, the Court looked to the tribe's
economy to determine what must have been intended:
The purpose of the Metlakahtlans, in going to the islands, was to estab-
lish an Indian colony which would be self-sustaining and reasonably free
from the obstacles which attend the advancement of a primitive people.
They were largely fishermen and hunters, accustomed to live from the re-
turns of these vocations, and looked upon the islands as a suitable location
for their colony, because the fishery adjacent to the shore would afford a
primary means of subsistence and a promising opportunity for industrial
and commercial development. 235
The Court concluded that "[t]he Indians could not sustain themselves
from the use of the upland alone. The use of the adjacent fishing grounds
was equally essential. Without this the colony could not prosper in that
location.' '236 It was to be presumed, from the rules of liberal construc-
tion, that "Congress intended to conform its action to their situation and
needs," and had meant the phrase "body of lands" to include both the
uplands and "the intervening and surrounding waters.' '237
It was clear now that tribal lands set apart by treaty out of original
territory or by withdrawals of the public domain would be presumed to
include boundary and enclosed waters where essential to the furtherance
of the tribe's past and future economy. The result in Alaska Pacific Fish-
eries was followed in United States v. Romaine,238 a suit by the United
States to quiet title to island tidelands within the Lummi Reservation
against patentees of the State of Washington. The reservation had been
established prior to statehood by an 1873 executive order implementing a
treaty promise to "set apart" the island for Lummi use. The order ex-
pressly extended one of the island's boundaries to the low tide mark. "[I]t
is not disputed that the government had the power to grant for Indian res-
ervations or for other purposes lands to low-water mark,' '239 the Ninth
Circuit explained, obedient to Shively. And, as in Winans, "[i]t is not to
be supposed that in making the treaty the government intended to take
from the Indians any of the rights they had theretofore enjoyed in the
islands .... "240 From the evidence of the metes and bounds of the order
and the Lummis' historical condition as a fishing people, it was to be
presumed that the 1873 withdrawal included all of the island's tidelands.
Romaine actually quieted title to the Reservation's boundary tidelands
235. Id. at 88.
236. Id. at 89.
237. Id.
238. 255 F. 253 (9th Cir. 1919).
239. Id. at 259.
240. Id. at 260.
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in the United States for the use of the tribe under Congress' explicitly
temporary withdrawal. Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States24 1
involved submerged lands to which the tribe claimed permanent title
under a federal grant. The dispute was over minerals, moreover, rather
than a traditional subsistence resource. The Arkansas River bounded land
originally purchased by the United States from the Osages, but subse-
quently patented in fee to the Cherokee Nation when it emigrated west of
the Mississippi. The land was then resold to the United States by the
Cherokees and in 1872 repatented in fee simple to the Osages. Language
in the Cherokee and Osage patents carried the boundary of the reservation
to "the main channel of the Arkansas River. "242 When several oil com-
panies commenced state-licensed drilling in the riverbed, the United
States, alleging standing as "trustee" for the Osages, sought an injunc-
tion. The state of Oklahoma intervened, claiming that title to the riverbed
had passed to it automatically upon admission to the Union under the rule
of Pollard and Shively.
There was no dispute in Brewer-Elliott that the governing transactions
had been federal land grants rather than treaties ceding and reserving orig-
inal tribal territory. Further, the Court rejected any argument but that the
contested segment of the Arkansas River was non-navigable,243 taking
the case out of the context of Pollard and Shively. The Supreme Court
noted that previous federal decisions involving non-tribal grantees de-
ferred to local law the construction of midstream boundaries on non-
navigable rivers, 244 but concluded that "the words of the grant expressly
carries the title" of the Osages to midstream, 245 leaving no room for in-
terpretation. Furthermore, the Court stated, even if the grant had been
ambiguous, the rules of liberal construction in federal Indian law, rather
than state law, would be applied. 246 In this respect, Brewer-Elliott, like
Donnelly, was somewhat of a side-branch off the Winans and Winters
line. The import of the Osages' grant was plain, the land at issue was
regranted in fee rather than unceded and, because the stream was non-
navigable, there was no "trust" or policy in the state's favor.
B. Holt State Bank's Irnaginan, Heresy
Four years after Brewer-Elliott, the Supreme Court reconsidered tribal
241. 260 U.S. 77 (1922).
242. Act ofJune 5, 1972, ch. 310, 17 Stat. 228.
243. 260U.S. at 85-87.
244. Id. at 88-89. See also St. Paul & Pac. R.R. v. Schurmeier, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 272 (1869).
Brewer-Elliott remains the leading case on this point.
245. 260 U.S. at 87.
246. Id. at 83.
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interests in navigable waterways in United States v. Holt State Bank.247
The value of the case as authority is marred, however, by the Court's
historical errors and by the uniqueness of the case's facts. The contro-
versy centered on Mud Lake in Minnesota, a navigable body of water
within the area ceded to the United States by the Red Lake Band of Chip-
pewas in 1889. Under the cession agreement the United States was to
survey and sell the ceded tract for the Band's benefit, which it undertook
by patenting all of the dry land surrounding the lake. In 1912 the United
States proceeded to drain the lake itself and to survey the bed with the
intention of patenting additional lots. The Band, as patentee of several of
the original lakeside lots, adversely claimed title to the drained bed of
Mud Lake on the theory of accretion under Minnesota state law. Pivotal
to the Band's position was its argument that title to the bed of Mud Lake
had passed automatically to the state in 1858, when Minnesota achieved
statehood.
Relying on Shively, the Court framed the question as "whether the
lands under the lake were disposed of by the United States before Minne-
sota became a state." 248 The Court chose not to consider whether the lake
might have inured to Minnesota some time after statehood, such as when
the Red Lake Band had ceded its interest in the surrounding area to the
United States. The Court's preoccupation with identifying the status of
the lake prior to 1858 was where the trouble began.
Neither the upland nor the waters of the Red Lake Reservation had ever
been confirmed, bounded, reserved, or granted expressly by treaty or by
statute, although they remained unceded both before and for thirty years
after Minnesota statehood. 249 The flaw in the United States' claim of title
to the lakebed, and the reason it was defeated, then, was simply this ab-
sence of any form of federal acknowledgment of tribal proprietorship be-
fore 1858. Holt, therefore, presaged subsequent decisions of the Court
that were to rely upon distinctions between compensable "recognized"
tribal title and noncompensable claims by virtue of original occupation
247. 270 U.S. 49 (1926).
248. Id. at 57 (emphasis added).
249. The Court could identify only two pre-statehood Chippewa treaties, made in 1854 and
1855. The Court, however, failed to make clear the fact that neither treaty had involved the Red Lake
Band, which did not treat with the United States until 1863, at which time the Band ceded a large
tract of northern Minnesota. As the Court observed correctly of this 1863 treaty, albeit citing errone-
ously the 1854 and 1855 treaties, "[t]here was no formal setting apart of what was not ceded, nor.
affirmative declaration of the rights of the Indians therein, nor any attempted exclusion of others from
the use of navigable waters." Id. at 58 (footnote omitted). The Red Lake Band's treaty was excep-
tional in this regard, as the Court commented: "Other reservations for particular bands [of Chip-
pewas] were specially set apart, but those reservations.., are not to be confused with the Red Lake
Reservation .... "Id. at 58 n. 1.
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only. 250 Holt did not deny the right of a tribe to use the navigable lakes
enclosed fully and exclusively within its reservation boundaries. 251 Holt
merely denied the right of the United States, once the area had been
ceded, to withhold the lakebeds of navigable lakes from the state. Hence,
although the United States could have compensated the Red Lake Band
for its cession of the lakebeds, it was powerless to resell these lakebed
tracts to private parties in contravention to the interests of the state. 252 In
practical terms, then, Holt held that the possession of lands beneath na-
vigable waters passes automatically to the state when the tribe cedes
them, so long as the United States did not vest its interest in these sub-
merged lands prior to statehood by confirming or recognizing tribal title.
In 1858 the Red Lake Band was without treaty relations with the
United States and Mud Lake lay within unceded, original tribal territory.
Under federal decisions then in force, Minnesota could acquire only the
"naked fee" to the Band's territory, subject to the "Indian right of occu-
pancy." 253 Minnesota's fee would have been completely theoretical
under the principles of Johnson v. M'Intosh,254 affording it no actual pos-
sessory interest in the tract until the tribe quit it voluntarily. If, indeed,
the state had in 1858 acquired the "naked fee" not just to Mud Lake but
to the entire reservation subject only to the right of tribal occupancy that
ceased in 1889, Holt was correct in its result but incorrect in its methodol-
ogy. Title to the lakebed would then have been out of the United States'
hands, not because of the federal government's failure to dispose of it
before statehood, but because Minnesota's "naked title" ripened upon
cession in 1889.
What accounts for the Holt Court's preoccupation with the status of
Mud Lake prior to statehood? Did it matter whether the lakebed had
passed out of tribal hands before or after Minnesota's admission to the
Union? In making this status the pivotal issue, the Court may have been
trying to avoid the alternative problem of interpreting the 1889 Presiden-
tial agreement that had "ceded" the Reservation. This "cession" had
been for the purpose of subdividing and selling the tract for the Band's
benefit. Pursuant to its agreement, the United States had indeed sold part
of the tract. But not until 1908 did Congress authorize the expenditure of
federal funds to drain Mud Lake and subdivide and sell the reclaimed
lands for the Band's benefit. 255 In other words, there was no express con-
250. See generally notes 150 & 151 and accompanying text supra.
251. See 270 U.S. at59.
252. The Court noted that, if title was confirmed in the United States. the holding would affect
vast amounts of land underlying other navigable waters, as well. Id. at 58.
253. See generally part I.B. supra.
254. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (discussed in notes 52-57 and accompanying text supra).
255. Act of May 20, 1908. ch. 181. § 1, 35 Stat. 169.
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gressional recognition of the Band's interest in the lake until 1908. If the
lake already had been ceded, the 1908 act authorizing the drainage might
have been unconstitutional if interpreted to divest the state's interest. But
if the 1889 "cession" created a trust in the United States to manage and
dispose of the land to the Band's use, the Band may have retained a bene-
ficial interest until the individual tracts were sold. Hence, Holt could have
decided that no trust was created, or that the Band's acquisition of sub-
merged lands by accretion was not in conflict with the Band's residual
interest. Instead, it held that the United States' interest terminated in
1858, sidestepping the trust issue.
C. Tribal Title to Watercourses After Holt: Sensibility Restored
Holt's doctrinal insignificance was at once apparent to the courts and
subsequent federal decisions returned to the straightforward paradigm es-
tablished by Winans, Winters and Alaska Pacific Fisheries. At most, Holt
left behind the requirement that there be some evidence of federal "rec-
ognition," if not of tribal rights to the submerged lands in particular, at
least of the adjacent or enclosing fast lands. In Montana Power Co. v.
Rochester,256 the Ninth Circuit interpreted a pre-statehood treaty that had
established a boundary of the Flathead Reservation bisecting Flathead
Lake, a navigable body of wAter. The Reservation had been allotted in
severalty, but never terminated. The individual allotment in question ex-
tended into the lake and enclosed a small island. The original Indian allot-
tee had received his fee patent from the United States and, by mesne con-
veyances, the island had devolved to Rochester. Meanwhile the United
States had licensed the power company to erect and operate a hydroelec-
tric dam which caused periodic variations in the level of the lake, affect-
ing improvements on Rochester's island. The question, therefore, was
whether the individual allotment was meant to include the land below the
original high-water mark, as Rochester contended, or whether instead the
submerged land had been retained by the United States in "trust" for the
whole tribe, to be granted later to the operators of the dam.
"In the briefs there is considerable discussion whether, prior to the
treaty, title to these lands was vested in the United States subject only to
the Indian rights of occupancy, or whether the treaty merely confirmed in
the Indians a title which they already had," the Ninth Circuit wrote, 257
"but we think the question is academic."
Whether the ownership was originally in the Indians or in the United States,
256. 127 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1942).
257. Id. at 191.
669
Washington Law Review
it is certain that by the treaty the United States undertook to hold title to the
reserved area . . . in trust for the confederated tribes. [T]he treaty leaves no
room for doubt that the government chose to hold the entire area, sub-
merged lands no less than uplands, in trust for the Indians rather than for the
future state to be carved out of the region. 258
Because of the lake's economic significance as an Indian fishery, moreo-
ver, the court found it "inadmissible to suppose that the United States,
having agreed to hold this area in trust for the exclusive use and benefit of
the Indian tribes, intended to put the tribes at the mercy of the future
state" by parting with the rights to the waters. 259 Since the metes and
bounds in the treaty indicated that half the lakebed originally had been
reserved to the tribe, the question became whether the United States had
intended to dispose of the tribe's lakebed interest to individual tribal
members through allotment. "The general rule . . . is that patents of the
United States to lands bordering navigable waters, in the absence of spe-
cial circumstances, convey only to high water mark," the court ob-
served, 260 citing Shively. The issue before the court, however, was not
strictly one of a grant of federal lands, but rather of tribal lands. Since the
tribe was, by the court's assumption, a "communal" society, the court
presumed that the tribe would have wished to retain collective ownership
of the waters and fisheries in the lake. 261 Based on this "special circum-
stance," the court concluded that individual allotments probably had not
intended to make the lakebed private property. Ironically, this holding
meant that the United States retained "trust" title to grant later to a non-
Indian business without tribal consent.
The Ninth Circuit again explored the uneven ground of tribal rights to
submerged lands in Moore v. United States,262 a case on its facts much
like Alaska Pacific Fisheries and Romaine. Before Washington became a
state the United States had promised by treaty to set aside a tract of land
"sufficient for their wants" for the "exclusive use" of the Quilleutes. 263
Pursuant to this obligation, a subsequent executive order set apart a tract
enclosing part of the Quilleute River and its tidal estuary. The Quilleutes
had always been fishermen and still lived principally from the river and
258. Id.
259. Id. at 192. Actually, however, the Flathead's treaty had reserved only the "use and occupa-
tion" of the land-not, as the Ninth Circuit stated, the "exclusive" use and occupation. See Treaty
of July 16, 1855, art. 2. 12 Stat. 975.
260. 127 F.2d at 192.
261. Id.
262. 157 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1946).
263. Id. at 762. Moore overruled Taylor v. United States, 44 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1930). which
had erroneously assumed that the Quilleute Reservation had not been established until after Washing-
ton's statehood. Id. at 764.
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ocean, leading to the inescapable conclusion that enclosure of the river
and tidelands had been intentional and operated to secure title "in trust"
for the tribe's use. 264 Significantly, the court distinguished Holt as a case
involving no evidence either of historical tribal use of the waters or of
federal acknowledgment of the tribe's rights and interests in the wa-
ters, 265 factors which should have distinguished Holt from Montana as
well. The court was equally unimpressed by the argument that the United
States' "trust" to protect the public's right of navigation would be vio-
lated by tribal ownership and exclusive fishery of the river, observing that
free navigation would not be obstructed by the tribe's activities.266
Still another fishing case demonstrated the little weight that the Su-
preme Court itself accorded to its decision in Holt, and the extent to
which it still considered Alaska Pacific Fisheries controlling. Like Alaska
Pacific Fisheries, Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co. 267 involved a conflict
between Alaska native fishermen and a non-Indian fishing company. Act-
ing under his general statutory land-withdrawal powers, 268 the Secretary
of the Interior had added the tidelands to fast lands already reserved for
Karluk Native Village, thereby deliberately giving the village an exclu-
sive salmon fishery of immense commercial value. Not citing, but almost
certainly thinking of, Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 269 the Court indicated
that "a statute that authorizes permanent disposition of federal property
would be most strictly construed to avoid inclusion of fisheries by impli-
cation, '"270 and that "[i]t would take specific and unambiguous legisla-
tion" to sever fisheries from Alaska permanently. 271 Nevertheless, the
Court found that the intent of the Secretary was clear, all the more so in
view of the history and habits of Alaska Natives. 272 In Montana, the his-
tory and habits of the Crows would be virtually ignored in the Court's
rush to follow Holt.273
The Hynes Court, however, distinguished carefully between an exclu-
sive fishery and ownership of the tidelands. It noted that the fishery in
question was not a treaty reservation, but rather had been made under a
general authority to make "temporary" withdrawals "until revoked" by
the President or Congress. 274 Based on its previous decisions, the Court
264. Moore, 157 F.2d at 764.
265. Id. at 765.
266. Id. at 765.
267. 337U.S. 86(1949).
268. See generally Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 421, 36 Stat. 847.
269. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367(1842) (discussed in notes 175-180 and accompanying text supra).
270. 337 U.S. at 104.
271. Id. at 105.
272. Seeid. at 106n.26, 110-14, 116.
273. See part IV. B. infra.
274. 337 U.S. at I01.
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concluded that "[a]n Indian Reservation created by Executive Order of
the President conveys no right of use or occupancy to the beneficiaries
beyond the pleasure of Congress or the President.''275 Consequently,
"[wjhen Congress intends to delegate power to turn over lands to the Indi-
ans permanently, one would expect to and doubtless would find definite
indications of such a purpose. "276 Hence, the Court found that Karluk
Native Village had the right to exclude competing fisheries for the time
being, but no "title"-this because the tidelands were held explicitly
under a temporary administrative order, not retained by treaty or act out
of the tribe's original territory.
An interesting counterpoint to these fishing cases was the Ninth Cir-
cuit's 1963 decision in Skokomish Indian Tribe v. France,277 an action by
the tribe itself to quiet title in boundary tidelands. In a pre-statehood
treaty, the United States had agreed to reserve land for this tribe at the
head of Hood Canal in Puget Sound, within the area ceded. This land was
set aside by executive order, but only after statehood. The Ninth Circuit
distinguished Moore and Alaska Pacific Fisheries on the basis that the
historical evidence indicated that the reservation "was not intended to
support these Indians," 278 since the tidelands actually at issue were
rocky, barren, and unproductive. 279 If nothing else, Skokomish should
have served to remind tribes that the underlying rationale of most sub-
merged-lands cases since United States v. Winans had been a presumed
intent that the reservation grant would provide for the tribe's economic
needs, as demonstrated by the tribe's past and future economy. The law,
in general, remained one of "liberal construction," but a tribe easily
could lose on the facts.
D. Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma: Liberal Construction Triumphant
In 1963, the "Winters doctrine" of implying reservations of water
rights to riparian tribal lands280 was resoundingly affirmed in Arizona v.
California.2 8 1 In 1970, the Supreme Court vigorously renewed and
strengthened the Winans and Winters line of decisions on tribal rights to
submerged lands in Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma.282 In Choctaw Nation
the Court did not skirt the issue of tribal title to the land itself, as had most
275. Id. at 103.
276. Id. at 104.
277. 320 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1963).
278. Id. at 212.
279. See id. at 209-11.
280. See generally notes 228-230 and accompanying text supra.
281. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
282. 397 U.S. 620 (1970).
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of the Court's previous opinions. Like Brewer-Elliott, the case involved
mining in the bed of the Arkansas River where it formed the eastern
boundary of nineteenth century treaty grants to the Cherokee and Choc-
taw Nations. The tribe asserted "title to the bed of the Arkansas River by
treaty and patent from the United States.' '283 The sole issue thus raised by
the case, according to Justice Marshall, was "whether the treaty grants
from the United States conveyed title to the bed of the Arkansas River"
as alleged.284
Whether the United States had conveyed title to the riverbed would
necessarily depend upon federal intent, Justice Marshall explained. 285
Where not expressly stated, this federal intent would be inferred from the
treaties, with the treaties construed in tribes' favor and as they would
have understood them. 286 Applying this standard to the facts at hand, Jus-
tice Marshall found it to be a "natural inference . . . that all the land
within [the treaties'] metes and bounds was conveyed, including the
banks and bed of rivers. '"287 He explained that since the metes and
bounds of the grant ran to the middle of the Arkansas River, it conse-
quently was reasonable to infer that half the bed was included. So much
already had been said in Brewer-Elliott fifty years earlier. 288 But Justice
Marshall also noted that the treaty fixed a boundary between the United
States and the Choctaw Nation, 289 suggesting that the applicable rule in
the absence of the express mid-channel language of the grant would nev-
ertheless have been mediumfilum aquae, the traditional international law
of boundaries between states. 290
The express inclusion of half the bed in the grant established prima
facie the United States' intention to vest title in the Choctaws. No discus-
sion of the tribe's past or future economy was necessary or undertaken,
because the claimed waters lay within the Choctaws' metes and bounds.
But, lest there be any confusion with the state rights rule of Pollard and
Shively, 291 Justice Marshall commented that the treaties granting the
Choctaws their trans-Mississippi lands also had promised them the right
of perpetual self-government, subject only to federal legislative preemp-
tion, and had further promised that the granted territory would never be
283. Id. at 627.
284. Id. at 628.
285. Id. at 633.
286. Id. at 631.
287. Id. at 634.
288. See text accompanying note 245 supra.
289. 397 U.S. at 632 n.8.
290. Id. (citing Haight v. City of Keokuk, 4 Iowa 199 (1857)). See also note 221 and accompa-
nying text supra (discussion of Haight v. City of Keokuk).
291. See generally part II.B. supra.
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included in a state or territory. 292 Tribal title to the riverbed, according to
Justice Marshall, certainly was consistent with this "virtually complete
sovereignty over their new lands.' 293 Indeed, it was "only by the purest
of legal fictions that there [could] be found even a semblance of an under-
standing . . . that the United States retained title in order to grant it to
some future State."294 The grant was not only explicit, but harmonious
with the apparent plan to perpetuate Choctaw self-government indefin-
itely.
Choctaw Nation left the courts somewhat more sensitive to the impor-
tance of metes and bounds in construing federal intent. United States v.
Pollman,295 a 1973 Montana district court opinion, explained Holt as ap-
plicable only in the absence of an express reservation by treaty or legisla-
tion. Where the waters claimed by a tribe lay within boundaries expressly
fixed by treaty, tribal title was to be presumed, 296 as in Choctaw Nation.
Similarly, in United States v. Bouchard,297 a Wisconsin district court re-
jected tribal claims of title to lakebeds on the grounds that the enclosing
reservations had been ceded prior to statehood and only returned to tribal
possession, if at all, by federal action after statehood. As in Holt, the
tribe's cession was deemed to have passed title to the state rather than to
the United States, and under the fifth amendment that title could not be
divested subsequently. 298 Nevertheless, the district court considered
Choctaw Nation controlling on the issue of treaty interpretation. Reject-
ing the argument that it should use Holt as a guide to interpretation, the
court stated: "[Tihe Holt standard is drawn from Shively, . . . a case
involving a grant of property rights to a private person, and the standard is
incompatible with long established and well recognized rules of construc-
tion for Indian treaties." 299
For once, the law was clear, albeit complicated by the complex facts of
each case. Or so it seemed.
292. 397 U.S. at 635. See also id. at 637-39 (Douglas, J., concurring).
293. Id. at 635.
294. Id. The Court did not acknowledge the paradox that this very promise. which appeared to so
compel the finding of intent to convey the riverbed, was broken by the United States when Congress
organized the Oklahoma Territory and offered it admission to the Union. See Act of June 16. 1906.
ch. 3335, 34 Stat. 267.
295. 364 F. Supp. 995 (D. Mont. 1973).
296. Id. at 998.
297. 464 F. Supp. 1316 (W.D. Wis. 1978),followed in Wisconsin v. Baker. 464 F. Supp. 1377.
1381 (W.D. Wis. 1978).
298. 464 F. Supp. at 1340.
299. Id. at 1336.
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IV. CONTRARY JURISPRUDENCE AT WORK: MONTANA V.
UNITED STATES
A. Asking the Wrong Question
The basic flaw in the Supreme Court's treatment of Montana v. United
States300 is contained in Justice Stewart's opening statement of the issue
presented for review:
The question is whether the United States conveyed beneficial ownership of
the riverbed to the Crow Tribe by the Treaties of 1851 or 1868, and there-
fore continues to hold the land in trust for the use and benefit of the Tribe,
or whether the United States retained ownership of the riverbed as public
land which then passed to the State of Montana upon its admission to the
Union. 301
Without discussion or authority, the Court merely assumed at the outset
that the Crow Reservation existed solely by grant, rather than by being
retained and confirmed out of original tribal territory. It is difficult to jus-
tify Justice Stewart's position. The Crows had occupied the disputed area
long before the United States existed. 302 At the time of their 1868 treaty,
moreover, the Crows had a right under federal decisions then in force to
remain in possession with or without the approval of the United States. 303
Why, then, did the Court construe the 1868 treaty language "reserving"
this land as being a grant? In 1978, in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe,304 the Court had broken with the rules of liberal construction by
presuming that tribes lack power to punish non-Indians' crimes unless
such jurisdiction has been granted expressly by the United States. 305 This
reversal of the established canons of construction was repeated in 1980 in
Washington v. Confederated Tribes,306 a case involving tribal taxation of
non-Indians. The Court appears so taken with the innovation of resolving
ambiguities against tribes that it was applied without hesitation or de-
300. 101 S. Ct. 1245 (1981).
301. Id. at 1250-51 (emphasis added). All parties apparently assumed that the rule of Shively v.
Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894) (discussed in notes 197-205 and accompanying text supra), was applica-
ble, and failed to contest the issue whether the 1868 treaty had "granted" or "reserved" the Crow's
Territory. In conceding the applicability of the Shively "presumption," however, the United States
suggested that "the force of the presumption varies according to the character of the claimant ......
Brief for the United States at 13.
302. See Montana, 101 U.S. at 1249.
303. E.g., Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842); Mitchel v. United States,
34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711 (1835). See generally part I.B. supra.
304. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
305. Id. at 208.
306. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
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liberation to the real estate problem in Montana.30 7 But the Court did not
admit it was changing the law. Instead, it concealed the change in its
statement of the "facts." In non-Indian contract law the usual and fair
assumption is that rights not specifically sold are intended to be reserved
by the seller. Describing the Crows as the "grantees" in 1868, as if this
were a matter of fact, the Court subtly suggests to those uninitiated in
Indian law that construing the treaty against the Crows' claims is only just
and reasonable.
B. Selective Citation: Lionizing Holt
In disposing of the Crows' claims to the riverbed, the Court cited only
three of its own decisions on the subject: 30 8 Alaska Pacific Fisheries '.
United States, 30 9 United States v. Holt State Bank, 310 and Chocktaw Na-
tion v. Oklahoma.311 Both Alaska Pacific Fisheries and Choctaw Nation
had upheld tribal title. Holt had found title in the state, and that was the
decision Justice Stewart followed. Of course, it was not as simple as that.
Justice Stewart relied heavily on Holt, in part because he misunderstood
public domain law, and in part because he misinterpreted the facts and
reasoning in Holt itself.
Justice Stewart began his inquiry with an analysis of the general power
of the United States to dispose of submerged lands to individuals prior to
statehood. Relying on Martin v. Waddell's Lessee312 and Pollard v. Ha-
gan,313 he stated, "[a]s a general principle, the Federal Government
holds such lands in trust for future States, to be granted to such States
when they enter the Union and assume sovereignty on an 'equal footing'
with the established States."- 31 4 "Congress may sometimes convey lands
below the high water mark of a navigable river," he conceded. "But be-
cause control over the property underlying navigable waters is so strongly
identified with the sovereign power of government," he reasoned that a
court "must, therefore, begin with a strong presumption against convey-
307. See Montana, 101 S. Ct. at 1252-54.
308. See id. at 1252-53, 1253 n.5. A similar narrow view of the relevant case law concerning
tribal rights to submerged lands was taken by Judge Sneed in dissent in United States v. Aranson, No.
77-2295 (9th Cir. Mar. 30, 1981) (opinion withdrawn and rebriefing ordered Apr. 17. 1981). In his
dissent. Judge Sneed cited only two cases on the subject. United States v. Holt State Bank. 270 U.S.
49 (1926). and Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620 (1970) and-like Justice Stewart in
Montana-considered Holt to be the controlling decision. Slip op. at 1036.
309. 248 U.S. 78 (1918) (discussed in notes 233-237 and accompanying text supra).
310. 270 U.S. 49 (1926) (discussed in part III.B. supra).
311. 397 U.S. 620 (1970) (discussed in notes 282-294 supra).
312. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842) (discussed in notes 175- 180 and accompanying text supra).
313. 44 U.S. (3 How, 212 (1845) (discussed in notes 181 - 185 and accompanying text supra)
314. 101S. Ct. at1251.
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ance [of such property] by the United States." ' 315 Nowhere did Justice
Stewart acknowledge that Indian tribes are governments, rather than indi-
viduals or private organizations. His own reasoning suggests that tribes,
as governments, are outside of the rule of Pollard and Shively v.
Bowlby. 316
Nor did Justice Stewart admit that the Shively rule had never been ap-
plied to defeat an Indian tribe's claim to the ownership or use of navigable
waters and their beds. His reliance on Holt to the contrary was error. To
begin with, he described Holt as a case in which the Court "applied these
principles to reject an Indian tribe's claim of title to the bed of a navigable
lake.' '317 This, of course, is incorrect. In Holt, the Red Lake Band had
ceded the area in question and the contest was over whether the cession
perfected title to the submerged lands in the state or in the United States.
The United States had argued that the lakebed was part of an Indian reser-
vation when Wisconsin was admitted to the Union, hence the "naked
fee" underneath the Indians' occupancy had remained federal. The Court
in Holt, however, was persuaded that Chippewa ownership of the lake
never was "recognized" before statehood, hence, the "naked fee" to the
accreted lakeshore passed automatically to the new state.
Under the "naked fee" concept of Fletcher v. Peck,318 Johnson v.
M'Intosh3 19 and Mitchel v. United States, 320 the Court was right. The
state had acquired the "naked fee" to the lake upon statehood, as a con-
comitant of equal footing. But the consummation of its interest awaited
the extinction of the Indian estate by cession. The state had no right to
bring an ejectment action against the tribe, and, until the cession, it could
convey to its citizens only the "naked fee." Holt, therefore, was not in-
consistent with prior and subsequent Supreme Court decisions affirming
tribal title to submerged lands. Applied in the Crow context, Holt should
mean simply that, should the Crows ever cede their reservation, full title
to the riverbed would vest automatically in the State of Montana.
Justice Stewart apparently also failed to read the Holt Court's cautious
comment that "other reservations . . . specially set apart" for different
tribes were not to be confused with the reservation at issue. 321 In other
315. Id. (citations omitted).
316. 152 U.S. 1 (1894) (discussed in notes 197-205 and accompanying text supra).
317. 101 S. Ct. at 1251.
318. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (discussed in notes46-51 and accompanying text supra).
319. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (discussed in notes 52-57 and accompanying text supra).
320. 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711 (1835) (discussed in notes 129-132 and accompanying text supra).
321. Holt, 270 U.S. at 58 n.l. Justice Stewart's confusion may be attributed in part to the briefs.
The State of Montana discussed Holt as if the Red Lake Band had entered into treaties with the United
States prior to Minnesota statehood, making it a case more like the Crows'. See Brief for the Petition-
ers at 22. Neither the Crows nor the United States pointed out that the pre-statehood treaties cited by
Montana were made with bands other than the Red Lake Band. See Brief for the Crow Tribe at 12;
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words, the Holt decision was limited to lands claimed by tribes but never
recognized by the United States. There was no possible argument in Mon-
tana that the Crow reservation had lacked federal recognition prior to
statehood, for it had been expressly confirmed to the Crows in their 1868
treaty. 322 Furthermore, the riverbed in controversy lies within the metes
and bounds of the treaty reservation, and one line of the boundary runs up
the mid-channel of another river, the Yellowstone, 323 exactly like the
boundary adjudicated in Choctaw Nation. On the face of the matter,
therefore, there appears no reason that Holt, rather than Choctaw Nation,
should have been followed.
C. More Footnote Jurisprudence
In a recent article we criticized the Court for concealing its pivotal rea-
soning in copious footnotes. 324 Justice Stewart certainly is guilty of this
practice in Montana v. United States. Having elevated Holt, by misstat-
ing its facts and holding, from peripheral status as an early but specialized
decision to that of a dispositive precedent, Justice Stewart had to deal
with the embarrassment of the Court's rejection of Holt a decade earlier in
Choctaw Nation. Rather than openly overrule Choctaw Nation and the
dozen or so decisions on which it was based, Stewart buried his discus-
sion of it in a footnote. 325 Even worse is the material falsity of every state-
ment in the Court's footnote.
According to this footnote, Choctaw Nation was a "singular excep-
tion" to "the established line of cases" on the subject of tribal title to
submerged lands, and was "based on very peculiar circumstances not
presented in" the Crow litigation. 326 The composition of the "established
line of cases" that Justice Stewart refers to here is baffling. The Court had
ruled on similar issues eight times previously; only in Holt had title or
possession gone to the state. In five of these decisions the Court expressly
chose to follow the rules of liberal construction rather than the rule of
Pollard and Shively presuming against the grant of submerged lands. 327
Brief for the United States at 20-22. Indeed, the United States took the position that the Red Lake
Band had treated with the United States prior to statehood, but that none of the earlier treaties had
recognized the Band's title to aboriginal lands. Brief for the United States at 20-22.
322. See Second Treaty of Fort Laramie, May 7, 1868, art. 2, 15 Stat. 649, 650.
323. Id.
324. Barsh & Henderson. supra note 10, at 626.
325. 101 S. Ct. at 1253 n.5.
326. Id.
327. See Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 632 (1970): Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas
Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 83 (1922); Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States. 248 U.S. 78.
89 (1918): Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908): United States v. Winans. 198 U.S.
371,381-382 (1905).
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In two decisions the Court did not refer specifically to the rules of liberal
construction but gave great deference to the tribe's economy as evidence
of federal and tribal intent when the reservation was established. 328 Only
one prior decision applied Shively instead: Holt.
Even supposing that Choctaw Nation was the exceptional case, how
was it distinguishable from the facts presented in Montana? Justice Stew-
art points to the Choctaws' treaties, which promised them that "no part of
the land granted to them ever shall be embraced in any Territory or
State,''329 and argues that "the Choctaw court relied on these circum-
stances ...and placed special emphasis on the government's- promise
that the reserved lands would never become part of any State. ", 330 This
does not seem a fair characterization of Justice Marshall's reasoning in
Choctaw Nation, which relied on the metes and bounds description of the
reservation to establish a prima facie case, and described the treaty's
other terms as supportive, rather than controlling. The reader of Montana
is left wondering how the Crows possibly could have known in 1868 that
rivers expressly enclosed within their territory had somehow passed to the
state for their failure to use a ritual form of words. This is exactly the kind
of problem the rules of liberal construction were intended to avoid.
Indeed, there is no reason to concede that the Crows lacked the kind of
territorial sovereignty enjoyed by the Choctaws. Justice Stewart stated
that "[n]either the special historical origins of the Choctaw and Cherokee
treaties nor the crucial provisions granting Indian lands in fee simple and
promising freedom from state jurisdiction in those treaties have any coun-
terparts in the terms and circumstances of the Crow Treaties .... ",331
What, then, did the Crows intend by reserving "the absolute and undis-
turbed use and occupation" 332 of all the territory within their metes and
bounds? It is difficult to conceive how the Crows could have been more
explicit, or could have iniagined that state ownership of rivers flowing
through their country was consistent with their "absolute" control. Jus-
tice Stewart is quick to tell us that "such phrases in the 1868 treaty...
whatever they seem to mean literally, do not give the Indians the exclu-
sive right to occupy all the territory within the described boundaries." ,333
328. See Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co., 337 U.S. 86, 106 n.28, 110-14, 116 (1949); Donnelly
v. United States, 228 U.S. 243,259 (1913).
329. 101 S. Ct. at 1253 n.5.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Second Treaty of Fort Laramie, May 7, 1868, art. 2, 15 Stat. 649.
333. 101 S. Ct. at 1253. Justice Stewart's discussion of the meaning of "absolute" bears an
eerie resemblance to the State of Montana's brief. See Brief for the Petitioners at 19. The conven-
tional 19th century definition of "absolute" was "not limited." See AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 6 (Webster 1855). The current definition of "absolute" as a legal term of art
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Is the Court saying, then, that an "absolute" right to a tract of land is
less than "exclusive"? This mincing of words is reminiscent of the
Court's comment in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe334 that express
federal legislation merely forms the "backdrop" for its judicial construc-
tion. Misplaced somewhere in Justice Stewart's concatenation of linguis-
tic non sequiturs are the traditional canons of construction. Worcester v.
Georgia335 established the standard of reading ambiguities in tribes' fa-
vor. The Court in Montana read express language favoring the tribe in the
state's favor. Construing the plain import of a word like "absolute" to
mean "shared" does little to enhance the Court's reputation for sound
logic.
The only apparent factual basis for Justice Stewart's conclusion that the
Crows' "absolute" use is less than "exclusive" was the concession of
the United States, appearing as the Crow Tribe's "trustee," that it asserts
a navigation easement on the Big Horn River. 336 The irony of this particu-
lar twist can scarcely be imagined by those unfamiliar with Indian affairs
litigation. The United States, advocating the Crows' "absolute" proprie-
torship-a right confirmed by the United States in its treaty-conceded
that the Crows' rights are less than "absolute" in order to protect its own,
inconsistent claims. In other words, the United States protected its own
interests by refusing to argue that the "absolute" rights it promised the
Crows really were "absolute" after all.
Justice Stewart also considered it significant that the Choctaws had re-
ceived their lands in fee simple from the United States. 337 In fact, no bet-
ter argument for the Crows could have been made. Since the Choctaws
held their land under a federal patent, there was at least some rational
basis for construing the scope of their rights in accordance with federal
public domain law, rather than in accordance with Indian treaty law. The
Choctaw Nation Court nevertheless applied the rules of liberal construc-
tion applicable to Indian treaties to the federal patents. On the other hand,
the Montana Court, faced with a reservation of unceded tribal territory
wherein the rules applicable to Indian treaties would be expected to ap-
ply, applied federal patent and public domain law. In this sense, both
is "'[clomplete; perfect; final; without any condition or incumbrance." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 9
(5th ed. 1979). In view of the word's accepted meaning, the Crows' treaty can not logically have the
meaning ascribed to it by the Court, which appears to be: "'subject to limitations neither discussed by
the parties nor expressed in the instrument, but to be discovered by the Supreme Court a century
hence."
334. 435 U.S. 191,206 (1978) (discussed in Barsh & Henderson, supra note 10. at 628).
335. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 350 (1832) (discussed in notes 158-160 and accompanying text supra).
336. 101 S. Ct. at 1253.
337. Id. at 1253 n.5.
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Choctaw Nation and Montana were decided the wrong way, with the
Court in the latter case compounding rather than correcting its own
former error.
The final irony cannot be discovered from the Court's opinion itself,
but must be found in the Constitution of the State of Montana. This de-
clares that "[aill provisions of the enabling act of Congress ... including
the agreement and declaration that all lands owned or held by any Indian
or Indian tribes shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of
the congress of the United States, continue in full force and effect
.... "338 Although the Pollard Court had suggested that a broad dis-
claimer of unappropriated lands would be unconstitutional, 339 the Court
has nevertheless on occasion enforced disclaimers of state interest in In-
dian lands as evidence of federal intent, with state acquiescence, to secure
tribal territory from injury or encroachment. 340 Hence, not only should
the Crows have the "absolute use" of their country, but the adverse
claimant may be constitutionally incompetent to assert its claims, as well.
D. The Irrebuttable Rebuttable Presumption
Notwithstanding all of these impediments opposing Justice Stewart's
choice of Shively as the rule governing the decision, the Crows ended up
having to try. to defeat the Shively presumption against the inclusion of
submerged lands in their "grant"'from the United States. 341 The Shively
presumption is supposed to be rebuttable; the Court never has declared
otherwise. In Montana, however, the presumption is so strong that one
wonders whether the Court currently shares the pre-Shively state rights
fervor of the Taney bench.342 Although Article II of the Crows' treaty
declares that "no persons ... shall ever be permitted to pass over, settle
upon, or reside in the territory described" by the metes and bounds en-
closing the riverbed, 343 this was not deemed strong enough to overcome
the presumption against the sovereign's conveyance of the riverbed.
344
Instead, this seemingly clear and absolute language merely " 'reserve[d]
338. MONT. CONST. art. I.
339. 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 224; see text accompanying note 104 supra.
340. E.g., McClanahan v. Arizona Tax.Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 170 (1973).
341. See Montana, 101 S. Ct. at 1251.
342.. See generally part II.A. supra.
343. Second Treaty of Fort Laramie, May 7, 1868, art. 2, 15 Stat. 649.
344. 101 S. Ct. at 1252.
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in a general way' ,345 the Crows' territory, Justice Stewart explained,
quoting from Holt. But Holt wa based on a finding that there was no
description or reservation of the tribe's territory at all.346
What, then, would rebut the Shively presumption according to Justice
Stewart? Only an "express reference to the riverbed."347 This statement
overrules, sub silentio, every one of the Court's previous decisions on the
subject, from United States v. Winans348 to Choctaw Nation, for in none
of those cases were the submerged lands expressly named in the convey-
ance or treaty, although in all but one case they were deemed to be in-
cluded. When Indian treaties were negotiated a century ago there was no
question that under decisions like Mitchel v. United States349 a metes and
bounds description was sufficient to vest all territorial rights in the tribe.
Since that was the practice at the time, it is not surprising that Indian
treaties do not commonly identify enclosed waters. If it stands, the rule
enunciated by Justice Stewart in Montana would work a retroactive
confiscation of most tribes' submerged reservation lands.
If blame for the Crows' defeat in Montana must be spread, we should
not forget their "trustee," the United States. Inexplicably, the United
States grounded the Crow claim on the assertion of fishing rights,350 an
economic justification for Crow use and possession of the riverbed that
the Court found incredible. "As the record in this case shows," Justice
Stewart explained, "at the time of the treaty the Crows were a nomadic
tribe dependent chiefly on buffalo, and fishing was not important to their
diet or way of life.'"351 Nor had the tribe improved and developed the Big
Horn's fishery potential in recent years. 352 As a result, the Crows' case
did not have the compelling facts, such as those present in Alaska Pacific
Fisheries, United States v. Romaine,353 or Moore v. United States,354 to
suggest that inclusion of fisheries and the waters to support them must
have been contemplated by the instrument creating the reservation.
Was the United States' reliance in its arguments upon the economic
value of Crow fisheries oversight, stupidity, or strategy? An argument
345. Id. (quoting United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49. 58 (1926)).
346. See Hoh, 270 U.S. at 58-59; note 249 and accompanying text supra.
347. 101 S. Ct. at 1252.
348. 198 U.S. 371 (1905) (discussed in notes 225-227 and accompanying text supra).
349. 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711(1835) (discussed in notes 129-132 and accompanying text supra).
350. 101 S. Ct. at 1250.
351. Id. at 1253.
352. See id. at 1249-50.
353. 255 F. 253 (9th Cir. 1919) (discussed in notes 238-240 and accompanying text supra).
354. 157 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1946) (discussed in notes 262-266 and accompanying text supra).
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could be made that the government was overconfident in such claims as a
result of its successful litigation of fishing rights on behalf of tribes in the
Pacific Northwest since 1970. 355 Its perception of treaty fishing rights as
central to the determinations in Montana v. United States was particularly
ill-conceived, since there were no supportive historical facts to speak of,
and no evidence of a serious development interest on the part of the tribe.
Not only was the fishing claim in the Crow context too narrow and inap-
propriate to support tribal title to the riverbed, but its use in Montana
created bad law that could affect the claims of tribes that actually do de-
pend on fishing for their livelihood. Based on Montana's weak facts, the
Court has given us a holding that tends to raise the burden of proof for
tribes asserting interests in waters and fisheries generally.
In effect, then, if not by design, the Justice Department may be de-
stroying tribal rights in the very act of asserting them. Rights that Con-
gress has not seen fit to condemn by overt and public legislation, the ex-
ecutive can abolish through clumsy litigation. A cynic might be tempted
to conclude that the current policy of the federal government is, "if you
can't lick 'em, join 'em." Joining with tribes in their assertions of rights
and powers, then assuming the initiative from tribal officials grateful for
the opportunity to pass off the costs of litigation to the government, and
then scuttling those tribal rights in court, may be the most insidious way
yet devised of eroding Americhn tribalism.
From the outset, the litigation in Montana was colored by the United
States' appearance as the Crows' "trustee" and attorney. The federal
lawyers' task was to persuade the courts that Congress had intended, in
1868, to secure the Crows' preexisting rights to the Big Horn River. At
the same time, however, they were scrupulous not to concede anything
that might have diminished the regulatory or proprietary interests of the
United States. If the river were original tribal territory reserved by treaty,
then the United States might have no enforceable interest in it without
Crow consent. To protect the federal interests to navigation and water
rights in the river-interests adverse to the tribes-the United States'
representatives allowed that the Crows might have lost some rights, such
as the right to regulate navigation, merely as a result of their condition as
Indians. Hence the Crows' "trustee" actually went into this case support-
355. The government was probably specially overconfident from its victory in Washington v.
Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979). See generally
R. BARSH, THE WASHINGTON FISHING Riorrs CONTROVERSY: AN ECONOMIC CRITIQUE (rev. ed. 1979).
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ing the notion of Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe356 that certain kinds
of tribal rights are lost by implication of federal silence, and can be re-
gained only by express legislation. This behavior should offer tribes fair
warning against relying on the United States to represent their property
interests in court in the future.
V. CONCLUSIONS: BAD FACTS, BAD LAW
The Law is the true embodiment
Of ever"thing that's excellent.
It has no kind offault or flaw,
And 1, my Lords, embody the Law.35 7
Many of the tribal nations of the high plains had societies of "contrar-
ies" whose medicine consisted of doing everything backwards. The Su-
preme Court's use of Montana v. United States to change established pre-
cedents and decisions is a like kind of legal contrariness. Cases in point
were tossed aside as "peculiar," and peculiar cases were applauded as
leading. Words were construed against their common meanings, and facts
that should have strengthened the Crows' position were held against
them. We have suggested elsewhere that the Court has avoided laying
down general principles of Indian law in recent years, preferring to retain
unfettered flexibility to treat cases individually and inconsistently. 358 In
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,359 the Court went so far as to char-
acterize the black-letter law as merely "backdrop" for its own case-by-
case perambulations. 360 In Montana, the Court takes the matter one step
further, juggling its own prior decisions without regard for their holdings.
Future tribal litigants may succeed in distinguishing Montana on the
basis that the Crows showed no specific current economic interest, and no
historical reliance on the Big Horn River fishery. 361 Nevertheless, the
356. 435U.S. 191 (1978).
357. W. GILBERT & A. SULLIVAN, IOLANTHE. Act I (the Lord Chancellor's entrance), reprinted
in THE COMPLETE PLAYS OF GILBERT AND SULLIVAN 245 (Modem Library ed.).
358. R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON. supra note 65. at 137-47.
359. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
360. Id. at 206.
361. In at least one district court case concerning Indian title to submerged lands decided since
Montana, the tribal litigants were able to distinguish Montana on the basis of their current economic
interest in and historical reliance on the waters in question. Puyallup Tribe v. Port of Tacoma. 8
INDIAN L. REP. 3079 (Am. Ind. L. Tr. Prog.) (W.D. Wash. July 24, 1981). In Puyallup Tribe the
court cited Montana for the proposition that " [tihe importance of fishing to the diet and way of life of
an Indian tribe is among the circumstances which can . . . support a finding that the bed of a river
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Montana Court's practice of ignoring the rules of liberal construction and
of shifting to tribes the burden of proving the existence of rights or pow-
ers can evolve into a dangerous legacy. When the treaties were made, this
burden of proof lay upon those challenging tribal interests. Treaties nego-
tiated under this assumption will not contain the specificity necessary to
withstand the Court's new test. In an age when the official policy on Cap-
itol Hill is tribal self-determination, economic development and self-suf-
ficiency, the contrary-minded Supreme Court is zealously, albeit by im-
plication and degrees, moving in the opposite direction.
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was included within an Indian reservation," and based its ruling that the riverbed in question was so
included upon the finding that "the Puyallup Indians centered their lives in and around the Puyallup
River." 8 INDIAN L. REP. at 3080.
